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I. WARSAW AND MONTREAL CONVENTIONS
T HE CONVENTION FOR the Unification of Certain Rules
Relating to International Transportation by Air (Warsaw
Convention) is an international treaty that regulates liability for
the international carriage of passengers, baggage, and cargo by
air.' The Warsaw Convention was created in 1929 to insulate
the fledgling airline industry from airline accident liability and
promote industry growth. 2 The Warsaw Convention sought to
accomplish this by "achieving uniformity of rules governing
claims arising from international air transportation. '
The Warsaw Convention has been revised and amended mul-
tiple times. In 1955, the Warsaw Convention was amended by
the international agreement known as the Hague Protocol,4
which the United States did not ratify.5 However, in 1998 The
Warsaw Convention was further modified by Montreal Protocol
No. 4,6 (Montreal Protocol No. 4), which the United States
ratified.7
I Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International
Transportation by Air art. 1, Oct. 12, 1929, 49 Stat. 3000, 37 L.N.T.S. II [hereinaf-
ter Warsaw Convention].
2 Weiss v. El A] Isr. Airlines, Ltd., 433 F. Supp. 2d 361, 364 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
3 E. Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 552 (1990).
4 Protocol to Amend the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Re-
lating to International Transportation by Air, opened for signature Sept. 28,
1955, 478 U.N.T.S. 371 [hereinafter Hague Protocol].
5 Nissan Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Bax Global Inc., No. C 02-2516JSW, 2006
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 30555, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 11, 2006).
6 Additional Protocol No. 4 to Amend the Convention for the Unification of
Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air, Oct. 12, 1929, as





The Convention for International Carriage by Air at Mon-
treal, (Montreal Convention), 8 which became effective in the
United States on November 4, 2003, consolidated and modern-
ized the scheme that had governed the liability of international
air carriers under the Warsaw Convention.' Although the Mon-
treal Convention contains many of the same provisions as the
Warsaw Convention, there are several differences. Of particular
interest are those relating to the liability of an air carrier for
passenger bodily injury or death, and the creation of a "fifth
jurisdiction. '" 10 Under Article 21, the carrier is strictly liable for
the first 100,000 Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), but it can limit
its liability to 100,000 SDRs if it can prove that the damage was
not caused by the negligence of the carrier or that the damage
was solely due to the negligence of a third party.1 Under Arti-
cle 33, the Montreal Convention provides that, in addition to
the four jurisdictions where an action for damages may be
brought under the Warsaw Convention, an action also may be
brought in the place of the claimants' domicile if the carrier
provides service to passengers in that jurisdiction and meets cer-
tain other conditions.' 2
A. PREEMPTION
1. Weiss v. El Al Israel Airlines3
El Al Israel Airlines (El Al) "bumped"'4 plaintiffs off an over-
sold flight from New York to Jerusalem.1 5 As a result of being
"bumped," plaintiffs filed a suit under the Federal Aviation Act 6
(Federal Regulations) and also alleged both tort and contract
claims. 7 El Al filed a motion to dismiss on three grounds."8
First, it asserted that both the Montreal Convention and the Air-
8 Convention for International Carriage by Air, May 28 1999, S. TREATY Doc.
No. 106-45, 2242 U.N.T.S. 350 [hereinafter Montreal Convention].
9 Igwe v. Nw. Airlines, Inc., No. H-05-1423, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 1204, at *9
(S.D. Tex. Jan. 4, 2007).
10 Baah v. Virgin At. Airways, Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 2d 591, 597, n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
2007).
11 Kruger v. United Air Lines, Inc., 481 F. Supp. 2d 1005, 1008 (N.D. Cal.
2007); see Montreal Convention, supra note 8, art. 33(2).
12 Baah, 473 F. Supp. 2d at 596-97.
13 433 F. Supp. 2d 361 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
14 "Bumping is an airline industry practice whereby passengers are denied
seats due to intentional overselling." Id. at 362.
15 Id.
16 Federal Aviation Act, 14 C.F.R. § 250.1 et seq. ("Federal Regulations").
17 Weiss, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
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line Deregulation Act 9 preempted plaintiffs' claims. Addition-
ally, El Al claimed that that there was no right of action under
the Federal Regulations.20
The court began its analysis with the Montreal Convention
and highlighted Article 29, which states: "'In the carriage of pas-
sengers, baggage and cargo, any action for damages, however
founded, whether under this Convention or in contract or in
tort or otherwise, can only be brought subject to the conditions
and such limits of liability as are set out in this Convention.' 2'
In explaining the scope of this article, the court emphasized
that when "an action for damages, however founded, falls within
one of the Convention's three damages provisions, the Conven-
tion provides the sole cause of action under which a claimant
may seek redress for his injuries. 22
El Al argued that plaintiffs' bumping claims were essentially
claims for "damages occasioned by delay" and were governed
exclusively by the Montreal Convention.2 3 Plaintiffs countered
that their "bumping" claim was not for "damages occasioned by
delay" but for damages from the "complete non-performance"
of their contract with El Al, and as such the Montreal Conven-
tion did not apply.24 In analyzing this issue, the court sought
guidance from the Seventh Circuit's decision in Wolgel v. Mexi-
cana Airlines,25 where a bumping claim was found to be a claim
for complete non-performance of the contract, rather than de-
lay under Article 19.26 The court noted that the Wolgel court's
interpretation of the Montreal Convention was historically accu-
rate. 27 The drafters of the Montreal Convention specifically
chose not to define "delay" and expected courts to mold its defi-
nition on a case-by-case basis.28 The court also was persuaded by
decisional law in foreign jurisdictions, including Canada, Ger-
many, Italy, and France, which found that "bumping" consti-
18 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (codified as amended in scattered sections
of 49 U.S.C.).
'9 Weiss, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 362.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 365 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 8, art. 29).
22 Id.
23 Id. at 366.
24 Id.
25 821 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1987).
26 Id. at 445.
27 Weiss, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 368-69.
28 Id.
212
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tuted the non-performance of a contract and was not governed
by the Montreal Convention.29
The court considered the Supreme Court's decision in El Al
Israel Airlines v. Tseng, ° where it emphasized the "drafting his-
tory" of the Convention and its stated goal regarding interna-
tional uniformity of rules governing claims arising from
international air transportation.' 1 The Weiss court concluded
that, in the "interest of international uniformity" and "the
greater focus on consumer protection intended in the Montreal
Convention, plaintiffs' bumping claims" did not constitute
claims for delay, but for non-performance of contract. '3 2 Thus,
plaintiffs' claims were not preempted under the Montreal
Convention.33
The court next addressed El Al's argument that the Airline
Deregulation Act (ADA) preempted plaintiffs' claims. Under
the Act, no state may "'enact or enforce a law, regulation, or
other provision having the force and effect of law related to a
price, route, or service of an air carrier. '' 34 The court consid-
ered the United States Supreme Court's decision in American
Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens.35 In Wolens, the Supreme Court held that
the ADA only preempted claims brought under state tort law
and not state contract law because contract law involves agree-
ments between private individuals. 6 The Wolens court found
that the ADA's preemption clause did not "shelter airlines from
suits alleging no violation of state-imposed obligations, but seek-
ing recovery solely for the airline's alleged breach of its own, self
imposed undertaking. 3' Accordingly, the Southern District of
New York held that the Weiss plaintiffs' tort claims were pre-
empted, but that their state-law-based contract claims were
not.3
8
Finally, the Weiss court agreed with El Al's argument that the
Federal Regulations did not support plaintiffs' "bumping"
claims.3 ' The court cited numerous cases that indicated that
29 Id. at 368.
30 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
31 Weiss, 433 F. Supp. at 368 (citing Teng, 525 U.S. 167-69).
32 Id. at 369.
33 Id.
34 Id. (quoting 49 U.S.C. § 417-13(b)(1) (2006)).
35 Id. (citing Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 228-29 (1994)).
36 Id.
37 Wolens, 513 U.S. at 228.
38 Weiss, 433 F. Supp. 2d at 370.
39 Id.
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only the Secretary of Transportation or the Attorney General
could bring a suit under the Federal Aviation Act."4 As a result,
this cause of action was dismissed.41
[In a subsequent decision, which is summarized below on
page 31 under Section G. Airline Deregulation Act, the court ad-
dressed a motion for reconsideration filed by plaintiffs, which
requested that the court reconsider its dismissal of plaintiffs'
tort cause of action.]
2. Mbaba v. Societe Air France"2
Plaintiff in this case purchased a ticket from his employer,
Federal Express, for an Air France flight from Houston, Texas to
Lagos, Nigeria with a layover in Paris, France. 3 Plaintiff had
four extra bags, so he paid an excess bag fee of $130.00 per bag,
which totaled $520.00 for his four bags."4 During his layover in
Paris, Air France unloaded all of plaintiff's bags from the
plane.4 5 Air France asserted that it did so because plaintiff had
purchased his ticket through his employer and was flying as a
non-revenue passenger. 46 At some point during the layover,
however, plaintiff missed his scheduled flight to Lagos. 47 As a
result, plaintiff reclaimed his checked luggage and stayed in the
airport that night."' When plaintiff checked in for another
flight to Lagos the next day, an Air France agent told him that
he had a new excess luggage fee of $4,048.66, which was based
on the weight of his luggage, rather than the number of excess
bags. 9 Plaintiff claimed that Air France would not allow him to
send the extra bags back to Houston.5 ° Plaintiff alleged that the
airline threatened to burn his luggage if he did not pay the
fee.5' Consequently, plaintiff charged the extra bag fees on his
credit card.52
40 Id. at 371.
41 Id.
42 457 F.3d 496 (5th Cir. 2006).












Plaintiff sued Air France in Texas state court and alleged
claims of fraud, breach of contract, and violation of the Texas
Deceptive Trade Practices Act. ." Air France removed the case
to federal court where it won summary judgment following dis-
covery.54 Specifically, the court found that plaintiffs claims had
been preempted by the Warsaw Convention.55
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit af-
firmed, holding that plaintiff's claims were entirely preempted
by the Warsaw Convention as amended by Montreal Protocol
No. 4.56 Plaintiff argued that his claims were not preempted be-
cause his injury did not fall within the general categories of the
Montreal Protocol No. 4 which he claimed limited recovery to
"personal injury, lost or damaged baggage, or delay. '' 57 Accord-
ing to plaintiff, the district court's holding was incorrect because
it meant that "unless an injury is specified in the Warsaw Con-
vention, there can be no remedy for it. '' Ss
Relying on El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng and Article 24 of
the Warsaw Convention as amended by Montreal Protocol No.
4, which states that "[i]n the carriage of passengers and bag-
gage, any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in [the War-
saw] Convention," the court concluded that plaintiffs claims
could only be brought under the terms of the Montreal Conven-
tion, regardless of whether a remedy was available. 59
B. DEFINITION OF "ACCIDENT" AND "DELAY"
1. Oparaji v. Virgin Atlantic Airways, Ltd.6"
Plaintiff in this case purchased a round trip ticket from Virgin
Atlantic for a flight from New York to Lagos, Nigeria, with a stop




56 Id. (citing Montreal Convention, supra note 8).
57 Id. at 499.
58 Id. (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 177 (1999) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting)). Tseng interpreted Article 24 of the Warsaw Convention
before it was amended by Montreal Protocol No. 4. Id. at 498.
59 Id. at 498-500 (quoting Warsaw Convention as amended by Montreal Proto-
col No. 4, supra note 6, art. 24).
6o No. 04-CV-1554 (FB), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68636 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 19,
2006).
61 Id. at *1-2.
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ever plaintiff arrived in Lagos without difficultly.6 2 On the re-
turn trip, after clearing security checkpoints at Lagos Airport, he
was questioned about the authenticity of his passport while wait-
ing in line at the gate to board the aircraft.63 Plaintiff was
brought to an office where he was questioned by Virgin Atlantic
personnel about his passport.6 4 The Virgin Atlantic personnel
called in a British official responsible for inspecting the docu-
mentation of people flying to the United Kingdom. The official
determined that plaintiff could proceed onto the flight.65 The
Virgin Atlantic personnel then permitted plaintiff to board the
flight.
6 6
Plaintiff did not board his flight and instead demanded a writ-
ten explanation for the treatment he had received.67 After an
argument, the Nigerian police asked plaintiff to "accompany
them to another office in the airport."6 After meeting with the
police and making a written statement, plaintiff returned to the
gate; however, plaintiff's flight had closed for boarding.69
Plaintiff then requested that Virgin Atlantic honor his ticket
on another airline, but Virgin Atlantic declined. 70 Plaintiff sub-
sequently bought a ticket to London on British Airways. 7' Be-
cause London was not his final destination, plaintiff claimed
that once he arrived there he had no choice but to beg for
money in order to buy both food and a ticket back to New
York.72
Plaintiff commenced an action against Virgin Atlantic alleging
various state-law-based causes of action.73 After removing the
case to federal court, Virgin Atlantic moved for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that the Warsaw Convention provided
plaintiffs exclusive remedy.74
Turning first to Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention, the
court analyzed whether plaintiff could satisfy the three condi-
62 Id. at *2.
63 Id.
64 Id.
65 Id. at *2-3.






72 Id. at *3-4.
73 Id. at *4.
74 Id.
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tions set forth in Eastern Airlines v. Floyd.75 "'(1) there has been
an accident, in which (2) the passenger suffered [death],
[wounding], or [any other bodily injury], and (3) the accident
took place on board the aircraft or in the course of operations
of embarking or disembarking. ' ' 76 The court held that al-
though the first and third elements were satisfied, the second
element was not.7 7 The record established that plaintiff had suf-
fered "purely mental injuries," which under Floyd are not recov-
erable in the absence of a physical injury.78 Plaintiff, therefore,
could not recover under Article 17.
The court then analyzed whether plaintiff was entitled to re-
covery for "damages occasioned by delay" under Article 19 of
the Warsaw Convention."° The court found that although Arti-
cle 19 covered plaintiffs claims for damages for the missed
flight, plaintiff decided to "secure substitute travel," which ab-
solved Virgin Atlantic of any liability under Article 19.1 Among
other cases cited, the court relied heavily on Paradis v. Gahana
Airways, Ltd.,82 which held that "'[a] passenger cannot convert
mere delay into contractual non-performance by choosing to
obtain more punctual conveyance." ''83
2. Sobol v. Continental Airlines 4
The plaintiffs, a family of four, purchased round trip first class
tickets for travel on a Continental Airlines (Continental) flight
from Newark, New Jersey to Mazatlan, Mexico.8 5 The departing
flight was oversold and plaintiff Lora Sobol was forced to down-
grade to coach class.86 On the return flight, two family members
75 499 U.S. 530 (1991).
76 Oparaji, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68636, at *8 (quoting ERoyd, 499 U.S. at 536).
77 Id. The court, with very little analysis, concluded that the questioning of
plaintiff about his passport qualified as an "accident" under Article 17. Id. An
"accident" for purposes of Article 17 is defined as "an unexpected or unusual
event or happening that is external to the passenger." Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S.
192, 405 (1985).
78 Oparaji, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68636, at *9.
79 Id.
8o Id. at *10.
81 Id. at *11.
82 348 F. Supp. 2d 106 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
83 Oparaji, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68636, at *10 (quoting Paradis, 348 F. Supp.
2d at 112).
84 No. 05 CV 8992 (LBS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71096 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26,
2006).
85 Id. at *2.
8 Id. at *2.
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were also downgraded to coach.8 7 In both instances, Continen-
tal reimbursed the family for the difference in price between
their first class and coach tickets."' Additionally, Continental
provided a travel voucher, a free upgrade from coach to first
class on a later flight, and frequent flier miles.8 9
Plaintiffs commenced an action alleging breach of contract,
unjust enrichment, conversion, and punitive damages.9 ° No
physical injury was alleged, but plaintiffs claimed that they suf-
fered emotional trauma as a result of being separated from each
other during the flights.9 Subsequently, Continental moved for
summary judgment on the grounds that plaintiffs could not es-
tablish a viable claim under the Warsaw Convention.92
The court concluded that plaintiffs' claims were governed ex-
clusively by the Warsaw Convention.93 Article 24 of the Warsaw
Convention provides that "in the carriage of passenger and bag-
gage, any action for damages, however founded, can only be
brought subject to the conditions and limits set out in this Con-
vention.' '94 Moreover, in El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng,95 the
Supreme Court held that the preemptive effect of Article 24
"'precludes passengers from bringing actions under local law
when they cannot establish air carrier liability under the
treaty.' Accordingly, plaintiffs' state law claims for breach of
contract, conversion, and unjust enrichment were barred.97
The court similarly dismissed plaintiffs' claim for punitive dam-
age because Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention specifically
states that "'punitive damages . .. shall not be recoverable."' 9 8
On the issue of whether plaintiffs could recover under Article
17 of the Warsaw Convention, the court concluded:
the separation and segregation of the party does not qualify as an
"accident" for the purposes of the Warsaw Convention .... Sit-
87 Id. at *2-4.
88 Id.
89 Id. at *3-4.
90 Id. at *4.
91 Id. at *3.
92 Id. at *6.
93 Id. at *14-15 (quoting Warsaw Convention as amended by Montreal Proto-
col No. 4, supra note 6, art. 24).
94 Id.
95 525 U.S. 155 (1999).
96 Sobol, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71096, at *14 (quoting Tseng, 525 U.S. at 175).
97 Id.
98 Id. (quoting the Warsaw Convention as amended by Montreal Protocol No.
4, supra note 6, art. 29).
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ting apart from one's family can hardly be described as out of the
ordinary or unexpected on a plane flight, nor is the rigid en-
forcement of the boundary between first class and coach a sur-
prise to anyone who has flown before. Neither would the
theoretical emotional distress of learning of the downgrade qual-
ify as out of the ordinary or unexpected for those, like plaintiffs,
accustomed to travel .... 99
The court also noted that plaintiffs could not satisfy the re-
quirement that a bodily injury occurred, and cited Eastern Air-
lines v. Floyd, in which the United States Supreme Court held
that "'Article 17 does not allow recovery for purely mental inju-
ries."'1 00 Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of Continental and dismissed plaintiffs' complaint with
prejudice.101
C. "ALL NECESSARY MEAsuREs" DEFENSE
1. Medina v. American Airlines, Inc.' °2
During a flight from Miami, Florida to Cali, Columbia, plain-
tiff was burned by hot coffee.' °3 As a result, he commenced an
action seeking damages under Article 17 of the Warsaw Conven-
tion.'0 4 Following a bench trial, the court issued its findings of
fact and conclusions of law.
10 5
The court found that the flight attendant placed a cup of hot
coffee contained in a styrofoam cup on the folding tray table in
front of plaintiff.'06 Plaintiff testified that he picked the cup of
coffee up with his right hand, [and] "'tried to take it to [his]
mouth, but it was so hot that [he] held up the other hand to
hold it"' and that he "'was getting [his] hands burned.""
07
Plaintiff then spilled the coffee resulting in severe burns to his
abdomen and groin area. 08
American Airlines argued that it should be exonerated from
liability, or that its liability should at least be limited, under Arti-
99 Id. at *12.
loo Id. at *13 (quoting E. Airlines v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530, 534, 552 (1991)).
101 Id. at *17.
102 No. 02-22133-CIV-COOKE/BROWN, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82805 (S.D.
Fla. Nov. 13, 2006).
103 Id. at *2.
104 See id. at *1-4.
105 Id. at *1.
106 Id. at *2.
107 [d. at *3.
108 Id.
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cle 21 of the Warsaw Convention, which provides in pertinent
part that "' [i] f the carrier proves that the damage was caused by
or contributed to by the negligence of the injured person, the
court may, in accordance with the provisions of its own law, ex-
onerate the carrier wholly or partly from his liability."'" 09 The
court agreed:
American met its burden of proving not only that [plaintiff] was
comparatively negligent in causing the accident, but he was the
sole proximate cause of same, as the only uncontroverted evi-
dence establishes that [plaintiff] attempted to pick up a coffee
cup with what he knew to be hot coffee and attempted to drink it
when, by his own claim, it was too hot to handle and he could
have put it back on the tray and/or allowed some cooling to take
place.'1 0
The court also agreed with American Airlines' argument that
it should not be held liable because it took "all 'necessary mea-
sures' to avoid the damage pursuant to Article 20.'111 Article 20
provides that "a carrier is liable unless 'he proves that he and his
agents have taken all necessary measure to avoid the damage
.... 12 The court held that plaintiffs bare allegation that the
coffee was too hot, without the support of expert testimony, did
not "create an issue that required a response."' 1 3 The court con-
cluded that the only credible evidence on the record established
that American Airlines took all reasonable measures to avoid the
damage and was therefore entitled to invoke the Article 20
defense.' 14
D. DEEP VEIN THROMBOSIS
1. Caman v. Continental Airlines, Inc." 5
Plaintiff was a passenger aboard a Continental Airlines ("Con-
tinental") flight from Los Angeles, California to Paris, France." 6
The flight was uneventful: there were no equipment malfunc-
tions or any other anomalies.' 7 Upon arrival in Paris, plaintiff
109 Id. at *5 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 8, art. 21).
110 Id. at *5.
III Id. at *5-6.
112 Id. at *5 (quoting Montreal Convention, supra note 8, art. 20(1)).
113 Id. at *7-8.
114 Id. at *6-7.
115 455 F.3d 1087 (9th Cir. 2006).




had difficulty walking and quickly sought medical attention." 8
He was admitted to the hospital and was diagnosed with deep
vein thrombosis (DVT)." 9 He stayed in the hospital for three
days and later received therapy.120
Plaintiff filed an action against Continental seeking recovery
for his injuries under the Warsaw Convention. 12' The district
court granted Continental's motion for summary judgment on
the grounds that there was no Article 17 "accident.' ' 22 Plaintiff
appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals.1 23
The court noted that "[i] t is well settled that the development
of DVT as the result of international air travel, without more,
does not constitute an 'accident' for purposes of Article 17 lia-
bility;' 1 24 this is because the development of DVT simply occurs
due to the passengers' own internal reaction to regular and ex-
pected aircraft operation. 125 Plaintiff argued that, although the
development of DVT itself did not constitute an Article 17 "acci-
dent," Continental's alleged failure to warn him of the risk of
DVT was an "accident" under Article 17.126
The court noted that this was an issue of first impression in
the Ninth Circuit and turned to the Fifth Circuit's decision in
Blansett v. Continental Airlines, Inc.127 for guidance. 128 In that
case, the Fifth Circuit rejected the identical theory of liability
alleged in Caman: that an airline's failure to warn of the poten-
tial for DVT is a departure from a known risk and is "unex-
pected. '1 29 The Fifth Circuit reasoned that the lack of any
Federal Aviation Administration requirement that a warning of
DVT be issued on an international flight demonstrated that the
airline's failure to warn of DVT was not "unexpected" and was
not an Article 17 accident.130
118 Id.
119 Id. Deep vein thrombosis is a medical condition that occurs when a blood
clot forms in a vein. Witty v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 366 F.3d 380, 381 (5th Cir.
2004). Deep vein thrombosis can cause serious medical complications if the clot
becomes dislodged and travels to the heart, brain or lungs. Id. at 382.
120 Caman, 455 F.3d at 1089.
121 Id. at 1088-89.





127 379 F.3d 177 (5th Cir. 2004).
128 Caman, 455 F.3d at 1090.
129 Blansett, 379 F.3d at 182.
130 Id.
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Notwithstanding the Fifth Circuit's decision in Blansett, the
court concluded that issues relevant to the court's inquiry re-
mained unanswered: "Specifically, whether an air carrier's de-
parture from either industry standard or its own company policy
are the appropriate benchmark for determining whether an
event is 'unexpected or unusual' conduct under Article 17 and,
more importantly, whether the inaction alleged here is suffi-
cient to constitute an Article 17 'event."' 1 " The court noted
that it is important to consider both Article 17, which provides
the framework for determining whether an event occurred that
triggers liability, and Article 20(1), which provides an air carrier
with a defense if it proves that it took all measures that were
required to avoid the damage, or that such measures were im-
possible to take. 132 The court explained that the distinction be-
tween these two articles is significant because, while Article 17 is
about the nature and cause of the event, Article 20(1) is about
the care taken to avert the event, which are clearly two different
inquiries. "'
The court concluded that plaintiff could not establish that his
DVT was the result of an "accident" because he was unable to
demonstrate that it resulted from an "unexpected or unusual
event." 
134
2. In re Deep Vein Thrombosis Litigation135
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation centralized pre-
trial proceedings involving numerous cases alleging liability for
DVT in the Northern District of California. 136 Previously, in
cases involving DVT related injuries on or after domestic flights,
the court granted summary judgment to the airline defendants
based on federal preemption. 137 In this decision, the court ad-
dressed whether the airline defendants were entitled to sum-
mary judgment in the cases involving DVT related injuries
during or after international flights governed by the Warsaw
Convention. 138
131 Caman, 455 F.3d at 1091.
132 Id. at 1091-92 (quoting Warsaw Convention, supra note 2, arts. 17, 20).
133 Id. at 1092 (citing Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 407 (1985)).
134 Id.
135 No. 04-1606 VRW, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 63394 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 2006).
136 Id. at *3-4.
137 Id. at *4.
138 Id.
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The district court's decision was rendered shortly after the
Ninth Circuit's decision in Caman v. Continental Airlines, Inc.'39
As Caman was binding precedent, the court concluded that it
was unnecessary to consider plaintiffs' proffered evidence of an
industry practice or airline-specific policies concerning DVT. 4 °
As in Caman, the failure to provide DVT warnings did not consti-
tute an accident under Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention,
regardless of industry standards or airline policies.'41 The court
nonetheless analyzed related theories of liability that Caman did
not specifically address.14 2
Plaintiffs argued that there is a difference between the failure
to provide a DVT warning and the inadequacy of the warning
that actually was given. "' According to plaintiffs, the focus
should not be on the lack of warning, but on the inadequacy of
the warnings that were actually given.'4 4 The court was not per-
suaded, stating that it "would be strange indeed if the failure to
provide any warning could not give rise to liability under Article
17 while the provision of an ineffective warning could."' 45
Plaintiffs then attempted to shift the focus to the airlines'
overall policy decision not to give DVT warnings.'46 Plaintiffs
argued that the airlines' "election" not to provide such warnings
constituted an "event" for purposes of Article 17.147 The court
rejected this argument, noting that the "event" under Article 17
must have occurred either on board the aircraft or during the
course of embarking or disembarking. 4 ' The policy decisions
by the airlines as to whether to provide DVT warnings simply
were too remote in time to qualify as an event under Article 17.
The court also noted that Article 17 was not intended to regu-
late the behavior of air carriers when there is no accident either
on board or in proximity to an aircraft." '49 The airline defend-
ants' motions for summary judgment were granted.1 50
139 Id. at *18.
140 Id. at *20-21.
141 Id. at *20.
142 Id. at *21.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id. at *22.
146 Id.
147 Id. at *22-23.
148 Id. at *23.
149 Id. at *28-29.
150 Id. at *36.
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II. TOKYO CONVENTION
The primary goal of the Tokyo Convention, which was ratified
by the United States in 1969, was to encourage nations to exer-
cise jurisdiction in instances where a crime was committed
aboard an aircraft registered in that nation. 151 Although the
main thrust of the Tokyo Convention focuses on criminal acts
committed on aircraft, the convention also covers "acts which,
whether or not they are offenses, may or do jeopardize the safety
of the aircraft or of persons or property therein or which jeop-
ardize good order and discipline on board."'5 2
A. EID v. ALsi4, AIRLINES, INC.'5 3
During an Alaska Airlines flight from Vancouver to Las Vegas,
nine passengers that were flying together in the first-class sec-
tion of the aircraft became unruly." 4 The captain received a
report from cabin crew that passengers were gathering near the
flight deck door and that they were continuing to stand near the
door even when told not to. 155 In a later phone call from a
flight attendant who was "in hysteria" and "crying," the captain
was advised that the flight attendant "lost control" of the first
class cabin. 15 6 The captain then heard a "bunch of yelling and
screaming" through the interphone and decided to land the air-
plane as soon as possible. 157 The captain landed the airplane in
Reno, Nevada and all nine plaintiffs were ordered to
disembark. 58
Plaintiffs filed an action alleging damages due to delay under
Article 19 of the Warsaw Convention, common law defamation,
slander, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion
of privacy.1 59 Following a prior motion to dismiss, the court
ruled that the state law causes of action alleged by plaintiffs were
preempted by the Warsaw Convention. 60  Plaintiffs then
'51 Convention of Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Air-
craft arts. 1, 3, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter
Tokyo Convention].
152 Tokyo Convention, supra note 151, art. 1.
153 No. 2:04-CV-01304-RCJ-(LRL), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45488 (D. Nev. June
15, 2006).
154 Id. at *2.
155 Id. at *15.
156 Id. at *16.
157 Id.
158 Id.




amended the complaint to allege further claims, which the
court again dismissed as preempted by the Warsaw
Convention. "'
Plaintiffs later filed a motion for leave to file supplemental
pleadings alleging seven new causes of action, all for defama-
tion, and allegedly arising after plaintiffs' amended complaint
was filed. 62 The proposed causes of action arose from publica-
tion or republication of alleged defamatory statements regard-
ing plaintiffs' involvement in the incident.'63  Following
plaintiffs' motion, the defendants filed a motion for summary
judgment seeking a dismissal of the complaint under the terms
of the Tokyo Convention. 64 After the court denied the motion
for leave to file supplemental pleadings because the alleged
causes of action had already accrued at the time plaintiffs filed
the original and amended complaints, the court turned to the
motion for summary judgment.165
Defendants argued that, under the Tokyo Convention, any ac-
tion taken by an in-command pilot or captain to preserve the
good order and discipline on board an aircraft is precluded
from liability. 6 6 Specifically, the defendants relied on Article 10
of the Tokyo Convention, which provides that "'neither the air-
craft commander, [n] or any other member of the crew, any pas-
senger, [nor] the owner or operator of the aircraft ... shall be
held responsible in any proceeding on account of the treatment
undergone by the person against whom the actions were
taken."'167
Article 6 paragraph 1 (b) of the Tokyo Convention provides
that:
[t]he aircraft commander may, when he has reasonable grounds
to believe that a person has committed, or is about to commit, on
board the aircraft, an offence or act contemplated in Article 1,
paragraph 1, (acts which whether or not they are offences, may
or do jeopardize the safety of the aircraft or ... good order and
discipline on board) impose upon such person reasonable mea-
sures including restraint which are necessary: (a) to protect the




165 Id. at *4-8.
1-66 Id. at *11.
167 Id. at *14 (quoting Tokyo Convention, supra note 151, art. 10) (emphasis in
original).
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safety of the aircraft, or of the person or property therein, (b) to
maintain good order and discipline on board; or ... (c) to en-
able him to deliver such persons to competent authorities or to
disembark him in accordance with the provision of this
Chapter. 1 616
Plaintiffs argued that the captain's decision to disembark the
passengers was not reasonable or necessary, citing testimony
that plaintiffs ultimately complied with the flight attendants and
returned to their seats.' 69 Plaintiffs also proffered testimony by
the first officer that if the captain had looked through the cabin
portal window and seen that all passengers were in their seats as
directed, a "less direct" response would have been appropri-
ate. 170 The court disagreed, stating that "[t]he critical inquiry
here is whether the Captain had reasonable grounds to believe
that a person on board the aircraft had committed 'an act which
may jeopardize the safety of the aircraft... or good order and
discipline on board."'" The court held that any action the cap-
tain or first officer could have taken is therefore irrelevant.17 2
Reasonable minds, considering the circumstances of this case,
could not differ with respect to whether the captain had reason-
able grounds to disembark the unruly passengers. 73 As a result,
the court held that there was no genuine issue of material
fact.'7 4 Thus, defendants were not liable under Art. 10 of the
Tokyo Convention and summary judgment was granted to
Alaska Airlines. 75
III. FOREIGN SOVEREIGN IMMUNITIES ACT
The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA) provides the
general rule that foreign states are immune from suits in the
United States. 1 76 The FSIA defines a "foreign state" to include
"any political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or in-
strumentality of a foreign state."' 77 In turn, "agency or instru-
mentality of a foreign state" means any entity:
168 Id. at *14-15 (quoting Tokyo Convention, supra note 151, art. 6).
169 Id. at *17.
170 Id.
171 Id. (citing Tokyo Convention, supra note 151, arts. 1, 6).
172 Id. at *17-18.
173 Id. at *18.
174 Id.
175 Id.
176 See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1609 (West 2006).
177 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(a) (West 2006).
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(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise,
and
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision
thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest
is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, and
(3) which is neither a citizen of the United States as defined in
section 1332(c) and (e) of this title nor created under the laws of
any third country.178
There are several statutory exceptions to this immunity in-
cluding the "state-sponsored terrorism exception," which pro-
vides that a foreign state "shall not be immune from jurisdiction
of courts of the United States" where money damages are sought
against a foreign state "for personal injury or death that was
caused by an act of torture, extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabo-
tage, hostage taking, or the provision of material support or re-
sources for such an act."'179
A. HARTFORD INSURANCE Co. V. SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S
LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRI YAl s)
Plaintiff, Hartford Insurance Company, brought suit against
the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya) to recover
damages sustained as a result of the bombing of Pan American
World Airways (Pan Am) Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland,
on December 21, 1988.181 The aircraft was destroyed when an
improvised explosive device was loaded onto a cargo hold on
the airplane.182 Before the details of the crime and identity of
the criminals emerged, many suits were filed alleging wrongful
death and personal injury against Pan Am based on negligent
failure to detect the explosive device.' 83 At trial, Pan Am was
found liable for the deaths of the passengers and was required
to pay full compensatory damages.84 In the course of defend-
ing and settling claims arising out of the bombing, Pan Am's
insurers spent over $500 million dollars. 85 Subsequently, Libya
accepted responsibility for the bombing.' 6 Plaintiffs filed a
complaint to recover the sums expended from the defendants
178 28 U.S.C.A. § 1603(b).
179 28 U.S.C.A. § 1605(a) (7) (West 2006).
180 422 F. Supp. 2d 203 (D.D.C. 2006).
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through indemnity and contribution and subsequently sought
to amend the complaint to assert claims under the state spon-
sored terrorism exception to the FSIA.'87
Defendants argued that the proposed complaint could not
survive a motion to dismiss or summary judgment and would
therefore be futile.1 8 8 First, the defendants argued that there
was no subject matter jurisdiction.'8 9 The court rejected this ar-
gument and reaffirmed its prior holding that it had subject mat-
terjurisdiction over this case. 90 The court refused to find the
recent decisions of Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran and
Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya applicable here. 91
The court noted that these cases dealt with whether the state
sponsored terrorism exception provided an independent cause
of action against a foreign state, not whether it conferred juris-
dictional authority. 9 2 In fact, the Cicippio-Puleo court specifically
found that jurisdiction was proper under the state sponsored
terrorism exception.19 Further, Pugh dealt with a property
damage claim, not a personal injury claim, and therefore was
inapplicable to this case.' 94
Defendants then argued that the proposed complaint failed
to state a claim.1 95 The court disagreed, though it noted that
the state sponsored terrorism exception does not, itself, create a
private right of action against a foreign government. 196 The
court also reaffirmed that generic federal common law does not
provide such a right.' 97  However, because the proposed
amended complaint asserted claims for indemnity, contribution,
and punitive damages under state law and federal statutes, the
court found that plaintiffs had asserted viable causes of ac-
tion. 9 8 Accordingly, the court allowed the amendment.'99
187 Id. at 205-06.
188 Id. at 207.
189 Id.
190 Id. at 207-08 (citing Cicippio-Puleo v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 353 F.3d
1024, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 2004), and Pugh v. Socialist People's Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 290 F. Supp. 2d 54, 60 (D.D.C. 2003)).
191 Id. at 207-08.
192 Id. at 207.
193 Id. (citing Cicippio-Puleo, 353 F.3d at 1036).
194 Id. (citing Pugh, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 60-61).
195 Id. at 208.
196 Id.
197 Id.




B. PUGH V. SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN ARAB JAMAIIRYA20 0
Plaintiffs' claims in this case arose out of the September 19,
1989 bombing of Union des Transports Aeriens (UTA) Flight
772, which exploded in mid-air killing all 170 people on board,
including seven Americans. 20 1 Subsequent to the bombing, the
French Government investigated the cause of the explosion and
concluded that Libya was responsible for the bombing and that
the individual defendants planned and coordinated the explo-
sion.20 2 The Plaintiffs brought suit against "the Socialist Peo-
ple's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), the Libyan External
Security Organization (LESO), Muammar Qadhafi in his official
capacity as Libya's Head of State, and six other high-ranking
Libyan government officials in their personal capacities. 20 3
Plaintiffs filed claims under the state sponsored terrorism excep-
tion of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act,2 4 as well as state
and federal common law causes of action.20 5
Plaintiffs moved for partial summary judgment, seeking a
judgment of liability against all defendants. 2 6 Defendants
opposed plaintiffs' motion and also moved for summary
judgment. 2 7
The court noted that there was no dispute that the court had
jurisdiction to hear plaintiffs' claims against Libya and LESO, as
Libya's sovereign immunity was waived because of the state-
sponsored terrorism exception. 208 The court then turned to the
claims against the individual defendants in their personal capac-
ities.209 Defendants argued that these claims should be dis-
missed because they were "'nothing more than a 'redundant'
suit against Libya.' ' 210 The court rejected this assertion, noting
that while naming both the government and the employees in
their official capacities would be redundant and inefficient, here
200 No. 02-02026 (HHK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58033 (D.D.C. May 11, 2006).
201 Id. at *5.
202 Id.
203 Id. at *3.
204 Id. at *3-4.
205 Id. at *4.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. at * 19.
209 Id. at *20.
210 Id. at *21 (quoting Holland v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 01-1924, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 40254, *35-36 (D.D.C. Oct. 31, 2005)).
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the defendants were named in their personal capacity.2 11 The
court explained that "the difference between official-capacity
and personal-capacity suits turns on 'the capacity in which the
state officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer inflicts
the alleged injury.' ,,212 The court also noted that the state-spon-
sored terrorism exception would be nullified if the court held
an individual defendant could not be held personally liable.213
The court next considered whether the individual defendants
could be held liable under the state-sponsored terrorism excep-
tion, the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333(a). 21 4 First, the court considered liability under the state-
sponsored terrorism exception and found that each of the three
prerequisites for imposing liability had been satisfied. 21 5 The
court also found that the individual defendants could be held
liable for violating the TVPA, which provides, in part, that:
an individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or color
of law, of any foreign nation . . . (2) subjects an individual to
extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages
to the individual's legal representative, or to any person who may
be a claimant in an action for wrongful death. 16
Here, neither side contested that the individual defendants
acted under the authority of the Libyan state when they assisted
with the bombing.217 The undisputed evidence established that
the actions of the individual defendants were calculated to lead
to the death of those aboard the flight, including the seven
Americans. 218  Accordingly, the defendants were held liable
under the TVPA.2 9
The court next considered whether defendants were liable
under 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), which provides that:
[a] ny national of the United States injured in his or her person,
property or business by reason of an act of international terror-
ism, or his or her estate, survivors, or heirs, may sue therefore in
any appropriate district court of the United States and shall re-
211 Id. at *21-22 (citing Robinson v. Dist. of Columbia, 403 F. Supp. 2d 39, 49
(D.D.C. 2005)).
212 Id. at *23 (quoting Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 26 (1991)).
213 Id. at *25.
214 Id. at *30.
215 Id. at *31.
216 Id. at *31-32 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2006)).
217 Id. at *32.
218 Id.
21') Id. at *33.
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cover threefold the damages he or she sustains and the cost of
the suit, including attorney's fees.2 20
The court concluded that the bombing satisfied the statutory
definition of "international terrorism," as all of the definitional
criteria were met.221 Summary judgment was granted on this
222issue.
The court then turned to the issue of whether Libya and
LESO could be held liable under the state-sponsored terrorism
exception and the TVPA. 223 The court agreed with prior deci-
sions from the D.C. Circuit that Congress did not intend to cre-
ate a cause of action against foreign states because the explicit
language of those statutes and their legislative history shows a
specific intention to limit their applicability to suits against indi-
viduals, not foreign states. 2 2 4
The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that federal com-
mon law provided a viable cause of action against defendants.225
The court rejected this argument, citing Bettis v. Islamic Republic
of Iran, which declined to apply federal common law in FSIA
cases. 2 26 Therefore, the court granted summary judgment in
favor of defendants on plaintiffs' federal common law claims.2 2 7
Finally, the court considered whether the defendants could
be held liable under state statutory and common law causes of
action, including wrongful death and intentional infliction of
220 Id. at *33 (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 2333(a) (2006)).
221 Id. at *35. "International terrorism" is defined as activities that:
(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a
violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or
that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdic-
tion of the United States or of any state;
(B) appear to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian
population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimi-
dation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government
by assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the
United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the
means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their per-
petrators operate or seek asylum.
18 U.S.C. § 12331(1) (2006).
222 Pugh, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 58033, at *35.
223 Id.
224 Id. at *37-40.
225 Id. at *42-43.
26 Id. at *43 (citing Bettis v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 315 F.3d 325, 333 (D.C.
Cir. 2003)).
227 Id. at *48.
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emotional distress.228 The court found that plaintiffs here did
not identify a particular cause of action arising under a specific
state's law.2 29 In essence, plaintiffs asked the court to disregard
any choice of law analysis and find nationwide liability. 230 The
court held that plaintiffs were required to amend their com-
plaint and allege their state law claims with particularity in order
to proceed with those claims.2 1
C. BAKER V. GREAT SOCIALIST PEOPLE'S LIBYAN
ARAB JAMAHIRIYA
2 3 2
Plaintiffs sued under the state sponsored terrorism exception
to the FSIA for claims stemming from the hijacking of Egypt Air
Flight 648.233 Three terrorists hijacked the plane using weapons
provided by Libyan government agents, which had been trans-
ported in Libyan diplomatic pouches. 2 4 After the plane landed,
the hijackers brought each of the three American passengers to
the front of the plane, shot each of them in the head and then
threw them from the plane.235 One of the Americans died from
her injuries, one was left with permanent and severe brain dam-
age, and the other recovered from his injuries.236
Plaintiffs-the American victim that recovered and represent-
atives of the other two victims-filed suit seeking recovery
against all defendants for battery, assault, false imprisonment,
wrongful death, intentional infliction of emotional distress, civil
conspiracy, and aiding and abetting. 237 Defendants were the
Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (Libya), Libyan
Internal Security (LISO), Libyan External Security (LESO), the
Syrian Arab Republic (Syria), Syrian Air Force Intelligence, and
various individual defendants. 2 8
Defendants sought to dismiss plaintiffs' complaint on the
grounds that FSIA claims require more exacting pleading stan-
dards than traditional claims and that plaintiffs did not meet
228 Id. at *49.
229 Id. at *50.
230 Id.
231 Id. at *53.
232 No. 03-749 (GK), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 83095 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2006).
233 Id. at *2.
234 Id. at *4.
235 Id. at *6.
236 Id. at *6-7, nn.5-7.
237 Id. at *9-10.
238 Id. at *3, n.2.
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this burden.2 3 9 The court rejected this argument, noting that
federal courts may not create pleading requirements that are
greater than those found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
("Federal Rules"). 24" The FSIA requires only that plaintiffs'
complaint provide defendants with fair notice of the claims, as
well as the basis for the claims, and the court found that the
complaint met this requirement.
24
'
Defendants also argued for dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint
with regard to the state law claims because plaintiffs did not
identify which states' laws applied.242 The court rejected this ar-
gument, noting that neither the Federal Rules nor case law re-
quires plaintiffs to plead legal theories in their complaint.
243
The court also denied defendants' motion to dismiss, finding
that defendants did not meet the standard of showing that plain-
tiffs were unable to recover under any applicable law.244 De-
fendants' motion related only to fair notice, arguing that the
amended complaint needed to specify the sources of law on
which plaintiffs intended to rely. 245 The court found that the
amended complaint gave fair notice of plaintiffs' claims, includ-
ing the sources of law upon which the claims were based.246 De-
fendants' mere assertion that plaintiffs' claims had no basis in
law was not enough to warrant dismissal.247
IV. AIRPORT AND AIRWAYS IMPROVEMENT ACT
The Airport and Airways Improvement Act established the
Airport and Airway Trust Fund from which the Secretary of
Transportation may make project grants "to maintain a safe and
efficient nationwide system of public use airports that meets the
present and future needs of civil aeronautics.
248
239 Id. at *13.
240 Id. at *11.
241 Id. at *15 (quoting Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1118
(D.C. Cir. 2000)).
242 Id. at *16.
243 Id. at *17 (citing Hanson v. Hoffman, 628 F.2d 42, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1980)).
244 Id. at *17.
245 Id. at *17-18.
246 Id. at *19.
247 Id. at *18.
248 49 U.S.C.A. § 47104(a) (West 2007).
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A. MINETA V. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF THE
COUNTY OF DELAWARE
2 4 9
This case involved a grant agreement between the Monkey Is-
land Development Authority (MIDA) and the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA), pursuant to which the FAA disbursed
funds to MIDA to acquire land for an airport in Delaware
County, Oklahoma.250 The County of Delaware (the "County")
co-signed the grant agreement as a sponsor, as required by the
FAA.25' The grant agreement was procured pursuant to the Air-
port and Airway Trust Fund, and the FAA and both sponsors
agreed to the use of grant funds. 52 In particular, the grant
agreement restricted alienability of any property the sponsors
intended to purchase with the funding.253 If the land was no
longer used for airport purposes, the sponsors agreed to dispose
of such land at fair market value or make available to the FAA
an "amount equal to the United States' proportionate share of
the fair market value of the land."2
54
MIDA leased airport property purchased with the federal
grant funds to private parties, who subsequently sued MIDA for
violations of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tion Act and other claims.255 The parties settled this suit and
requested that the court enter judgment against MIDA.258 Per
the settlement, the judgment was enforceable only against air-
port property257 and MIDA was required to convey ownership of
its real property to the private parties. 258 However, the settle-
ment did not mention or list MIDA's grant agreements with the
FAA, and MIDA did not acquire permission from the FAA to
transfer ownership of the property.259 Subsequently, the FAA ar-
gued that under federal law, a state law judgment creditor may
not execute against property which was acquired with a federal
grant.260 The creditors filed a motion to dismiss arguing that
249 No. 05-CV-0297-CVE-PJC, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 67566 (N.D. Okla. Sept.
19, 2006).
250 Id. at *2-3.
251 Id. at *2.
252 Id. at *3.
253 Id. at *5.
254 Id. at *6.
255 Id. at *7.
256 Id.
257 Id.
258 Id. at *7-8.
259 Id. at *8.
260 Id. at *9.
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the federal government exceeded its authority under the Spend-
ing Clause of the United States Constitution by attempting to
regulate the sale of property following attachment by a state
judgment creditor.261 The creditors argued that "allowing the
FAA to interfere with the proposed sale would effectively pre-
vent any judgment creditor from enforcing a judgment against
MIDA.... 262
The court found that the actions of the FAA, creating legiti-
mate restrictions on how the federal grants were used, were
within the scope of the Spending Clause.2 6 3 The court ex-
plained that the Spending Clause "grants the federal govern-
ment broad authority to spend for the general welfare and
condition the receipt of federal funds on compliance with fed-
eral law."'264 The Supreme Court has expressly permitted Con-
gress to condition acceptance of federal funds on compliance
with a federal program if the conditions bear some relationship
to the purpose of the federal spending.265 Additionally, the Su-
preme Court has recognized that Congress has the authority to
require that states spend federal funds as Congress intended.266
The court rejected the creditors' argument that the FAA "may
enforce grant provisions only against parties to the grant agree-
ment. '26 7 The court noted that this conclusion would mean that
the FAA could not dictate how to spend federal funds.268 Fur-
ther, the court found it was well established that property pur-
chased with federal grant funds is treated as federal property
and that federal property, even in the hands of another party, is
not subject to attachment by a judgment creditor. 269 Here, the
FAA had expressly notified MIDA of the conditions to the grant
agreements. 270 The conditions bore a reasonable relationship
to the purpose of the grant in that they ensured that the federal
funds would be spent for airport purposes.27' Moreover, the
grant agreement specifically stated "the FAA [had] a right to
claim its proportionate share of funds from any sale of Airport
261 Id. at *10.
262 Id. at *13.
263 Id.
264 Id. at *14 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 639 (1937)).
265 Id. at *17 (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167 (1992)).
266 Id. at *19 (citing Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004)).
267 Id. at *19-20.
268 Id. at *20.
269 Id. at *21 (citations omitted).
270 Id. at *21.
271 Id. at *22.
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property if the property is no longer used for airport pur-
poses. '2 72 The creditors were aware when they entered into an
agreement with MIDA that "federal oversight and intervention
was a legitimate possibility. '273 The court concluded that the
"FAA [was] clearly within its constitutional authority to protect
federal property from judgment creditors. 274
The creditors also argued that the FAA was limited to money
damages in Spending Clause litigation and that the FAA could
not prevent the creditors from selling the MIDA property.275
The court rejected this argument based on United States Su-
preme Court precedent holding that the federal government
may seek both contract remedies and statutory remedies.276
Therefore, the FAA had authority to sell the airport property if
MIDA breached the grant agreement. 277
After resolving the creditors' motion to dismiss, the court
turned to the government's motion for summary judgment
against MIDA and the County.2 78 The court found that there
was no dispute that MIDA violated the grant agreement. 279 Lia-
bility was therefore conclusively established. 280 The court also
found that the County was liable for damages as a co-sponsor of
the grant.2 1
V. AIR CARRIER ACCESS ACT OF 1986
The Air Carrier Access Act provides, among other things, that
a carrier may not discriminate against an "otherwise qualified"
individual because of a physical or mental impairment.2 2
A. CHIPPS V. CONTINENTAL AIRLINES, INC.283
Plaintiff, who was disabled and required the use of a wheel-
chair, purchased a ticket from Continental Airlines ("Continen-
tal") for travel from Wilkes-Barre/Scranton International
272 Id.
273 Id. at *22-23.
274 Id. at *23.
275 Id.
276 Id. at *23-24 (citing Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 187 (2002)).
277 Id. at *24 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 47107 (2006)).
278 Id. at *25.
279 Id. at *28.
280 Id. at *28-29.
281 See id. at *29-39.
282 49 U.S.C.A. § 41705(a) (West 2007).
283 No. 3:05-CV-2024, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10126 (M.D. Pa. Feb. 24, 2006).
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Airport to Kansas City, Missouri. 284 When plaintiff purchased
his ticket, he informed Continental that he was disabled and re-
quired the use of a wheelchair.28 5 Subsequently, plaintiff con-
firmed his travel plans and confirmed wheelchair accessibility. 28 6
When plaintiff arrived at the airport, he was informed that he
would not be allowed to board as Continental was not equipped
to assist him.287 Plaintiff was also told that he would not be al-
lowed to travel on any Continental flight without a traveling
2881companion.
Plaintiff commenced an action against Continental alleging
violations of the Air Carrier Access Act of 1986 (ACAA) and for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.289 Defendant moved
to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which
relief may be granted.9 0 Specifically, defendant contended that
the ACAA does not provide a private right of action and that
there was no allegation of conduct sufficient to sustain an inten-
tional infliction of emotional distress claim.291
The court first considered plaintiffs ACAA claim, noting that
the ACAA provides that "a carrier may not discriminate against
an 'otherwise qualified' individual because of a disability. 29
2
The court explained that in Alexander v. Sandoval, the United
States Supreme Court set forth the requirement that a "private
right of action to enforce federal law must be created by Con-
gress with intent to be determined by examining the statute's
text and structure. 29 3 Although the Third Circuit Court of Ap-
peals had not addressed the question of whether the ACAA
presented a private right of action, the two circuit courts that
had decided the issue determined that there was no private
right of action under the statute. 294 The court agreed, finding
that because the statute permitted an individual to complain to
the Secretary of Transportation, provided an appeals process,295
284 Id. at *2.
285 Id.
286 Id. at *3.
287 Id. at *4.
288 Id.
289 Id. at *5.
290 Id.
291 Id.
292 Id. at *7 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 41705 (2006)).
293 Id. at *7-8 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 276-77 (2001)).
294 Id. at *9 (citing Boswell v. Skywest Airlines, Inc., 361 F.3d 1263, 1269-70
(10th Cir. 2004); Love v. Delta Air Lines, 310 F.3d 1347, 1357 (11th Cir. 2002)).
295 Id. at *10 (citing Boswell, 361 F.3d at 1269-70; Love, 310 F.3d at 1357).
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and provided no express provision of a private right of action,
296
plaintiffs ACAA claim should be dismissed.297
The court then turned to plaintiffs intentional infliction of
emotional distress claim.298 Jurisdiction over the emotional dis-
tress claim was based upon supplemental jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1 3 6 7 .2" The court noted that "[o]nce a district
court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdic-
tion, it may then decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the remaining claims."300 The court considered the rele-
vant factors and declined to assert supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiffs emotional distress claims."' The court dismissed
the complaint without prejudice and left plaintiff free to pursue
the emotional distress claims in state court.
30 2
VI. DISCRIMINATION IN BOARDING
Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §1981:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have
the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce
contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to the full and
equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of per-
sons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and
exactions of every kind, and to no other.
30 3
The term "make and enforce contracts" includes "the making,
performance, modification, and termination of contracts, and
the enjoyment of all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions
of the contractual relationship. '"30 4
A. THOMPSON V. SOUTHWEST AIRLINES Co.
30 5
Plaintiff, an African-American woman, sued Southwest Air-
lines Co. ("Southwest") for damages arising from Southwest's in-
sistence that she purchase an additional seat under its
96 Id. at *10.
297 Id. at *14.
298 Id. at *14-15.
299 Id. at *15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006)).
300 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)).
301 Id. at *16.
302 Id.
303 42 U.S.C.A. §1981(a) (West 2003).
3o4 42 U.S.C.A. §1981(b).
305 No. 04-CV-313-SM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 4654 (D.N.H. Feb. 6, 2006).
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"customer of size" policy."" Plaintiff alleged damages under
New Hampshire and federal statutes, as well as emotional dis-
tress damages under state common law.3 0 7
Plaintiff was approximately five feet, eight inches tall and
weighed between 300 and 330 pounds at the time of the inci-
dent.0 8 She went to the Southwest customer service desk at
Manchester Airport, was issued a ticket and told to go directly to
the gate and board the plane.3 0 9 Although many Southwest em-
ployees had the opportunity to assess the passenger in relation
to Southwest's "customer of size" policy, no one said anything
until she was already boarded and seated on the flight.3 10
After plaintiff was seated, the Customer Service Supervisor
boarded the plane and asked plaintiff to accompany him back
onto the loading bridge.3 11 He then told plaintiff that "for her
comfort and safety," she needed to purchase a second seat.312
She told the supervisors that she would not purchase a second
seat; she re-boarded the plane and sat in her assigned seat with
the armrest down.3 13 Thereafter she was asked to disembark
and, when she refused, she was escorted off the plane by secur-
ity.3 1 4 Plaintiffs ticket was refunded and she later boarded a
flight on another airline.3 1 5
Southwest's "customer of size" policy requires certain passen-
gers to purchase a second seat for their own comfort and safety,
as well as for that of their fellow passengers. 6 The court noted
that the policy uses the armrest between the seats as a gauge of
whether a passenger is required to purchase another seat.317 If a
passenger cannot lower the armrest, they are considered a "cus-
tomer of size."3 Notably, the policy requires that Southwest ad-
dress "customer of size" issues at the earliest possible point of
contact with passengers who may qualify.3 19 Southwest's policy
306 Id. at *3.
307 See id. at * 1.
308 Id. at *3.
309 Id. at *3-4.
310 Id. at *4-5.
311 Id. at *8.
312 Id.
313 Id. at *9.
314 Id. at *10.
315 Id. at *12.
316 Id. at *8.
317 Id. at *5.
318 Id. at *6.
319 Id. at *8.
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does not require passengers to purchase a second seat in mid-
trip or once they have boarded a flight.121
The court first considered plaintiffs claim for intentional dis-
crimination under 42 U.S.C. §1981.21 Plaintiff alleged that be-
cause she could buckle her seatbelt and lower her armrest, she
was not a "customer of size,"322 and, if she was a "customer of
size," Southwest's policy did not require her to buy a second seat
after she had boarded the plane. 23 Therefore, plaintiff argued
that the real reason the supervisors asked her to purchase a sec-
ond seat was her race. 324
The court adopted the Sixth Circuit's test for a prima facie
case of discrimination, set forth in Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc.3 25 Under that test, plaintiff must prove: "(1) [she] is a mem-
ber of a protected class; (2) [she] sought to make or enforce a
contract for services ordinarily provided by the defendant; and
(3) [she] was denied the right to enter into or enjoy the benefits
or privileges of the contractual relationship. '326 The Thompson
court found that plaintiff produced sufficient evidence to estab-
lish all three elements. 327
The court then found that defendant had "'articulated a legit-
imate, nondiscriminatory reason for its action."'3 28 Defendant
contended that its agents were enforcing the "customer of size"
policy, which qualifies as a legitimate reason for their actions.329
The court then shifted the burden back onto plaintiff to show
that the defendant's proffered reason was a pretext.3 0 The
court held that a rational factfinder could have reasonably con-
cluded that Southwest's explanation for the behavior of the su-
pervisors was "unworthy of credence. '331 The court then found
a jury could conclude that the supervisors intentionally misap-
320 Id.
321 Id. at *14.
322 Id. at *23.
323 Id. at *8.
324 Id. at *14.
325 Id. at *16-17 (quoting Christian v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 252 F.3d 862, 872
(6th Cir. 2001)).
326 Id. at *17.
327 Id. at *18-20.
328 Id. at *20 (quoting Straughn v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 250 F.3d 31, 39 (1st
Cir. 2001)).
329 Id. at *20.





plied the policy to plaintiff and that racial animus is a fair expla-
nation for the conduct.33 2 Therefore, summary judgment as to
defendant's § 1981 discrimination claim was denied.33
The court then turned to plaintiffs remaining claims. The
court found that her state law discrimination claims failed be-
cause the New Hampshire statute at issue did not define air
travel as a "public accommodation. 3 34 Additionally, plaintiff's
emotional distress claims failed because no reasonable jury
could find defendant liable for intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress as there was no outrageous or indecent conduct
on the part of the defendant, even when viewing the facts in the
light most favorable to plaintiff.335
VII. AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT
The Airline Deregulation Act 3 6 ("ADA") preempts state
based claims if they relate to price, route, or service of an air
carrier:
Except as provided in this subsection, a State, political subdivi-
sion of a State, or political authority of at least 2 states may not
enact or enforce a law, regulation, or other provision having the
force and effect of law related to price, route, or service of an air
carrier that may provide air transportation under this subpart.337
A. HARRINGTON V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.3 3 8
Plaintiffs sought class certification in an action against various
airline defendants and the Federal Aviation Administration.3 39
Plaintiffs asserted that "the airline industry has acted unlawfully
in its handling of various taxes, fees and charges ... included in
the cost of non-refundable airline tickets."3 When a non-re-
fundable ticket is purchased, passengers pay various government
fees. 41 When the tickets are changed, cancelled, or otherwise
not used, the airlines allegedly retain some or all of the govern-
332 Id. at *23.
333 Id. at *25.
334 Id. at *26-27.
335 Id. at *29.
336 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713 (West 2007).
337 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b)(1).
338 No. 04-12558-NMG, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8144 (D. Mass. Feb. 21, 2006).
339 Id. at *2.
340 Id. at *3.
341 Id.
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ment fees.34 2 Plaintiffs argued that "such retention of fees ... is
unlawful and against public policy. 3 43
Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that plaintiffs'
claims were preempted by the Airline Deregulation Act (ADA)
of 1978, or in the alternative, that the claims were not viable
under state law.344 The court noted that in Morales v. Trans
World Airlines,145 the United States Supreme Court considered
the "relating to" language of the ADA's preemption clause.3 4 6
The Court indicated that "preemption should apply where the
challenged law or action has a 'forbidden significant effect
upon' fares, routes or services. 347 The Supreme Court also con-
cluded, in American Airlines v. Wolens, that although states may
not enact their own regulations regarding rates, routes, or ser-
vices, they may enact laws that afford relief when it is proven
that the airline stipulates to and then dishonors a contract
term. 4 The Wolens court noted that this distinction further lim-
its courts' consideration to the parties' agreement, with no con-
sideration of external state laws or policies. 3 49
Applying the Supreme Court's holding to this case, the court
found that plaintiffs' claims were preempted because enforcing
these state laws would have serious effects on the airline indus-
try, most notably in the realm of fares and competition. 5 ° The
court concluded that "it is undeniable that, should Class
[pilaintiffs succeed in enforcing their claims under Massachu-
setts law, airline prices and services will be more than marginally
affected and the ADA's deregulatory purpose frustrated." 5 '
Moreover, "an award of permanent injunctive relief under Mas-
sachusetts law in this case would either compel airlines to
change their practices nationally or impose different treatment
upon Massachusetts passengers. "352
342 Id.
343 Id.
344 Id. at *6.
345 504 U.S. 374 (1992).
346 Harrington, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8144, at *8 (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at
384).
347 Id. (citing Morales, 504 U.S. at 388).
348 Id. at *9 (quoting Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens, 513 U.S. 219, 232-33
(1995)).
349 Id. at *9-10 (quoting Wolens, 513 U.S. at 232-33).
350 Id. at *11.




The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that their claims
were preserved under the Supreme Court's ruling in Wolens15 3
The court found that there were no viable contract claims as-
serted in this case.154 Plaintiffs could not preserve their claims
by asserting that there were undiscovered contracts that sup-
ported their allegations. 5 Further, plaintiffs' argument that
the withholding of the government fees constituted a monetary
penalty that was unexpressed by the word "non-refundable"
failed under the most minimal scrutiny.356
B. WEISS V. EL AL ISRAEL AIRLINES3 5 7
The facts of this case are described in the case summary rela-
tive to the court's prior decision, which is located in section IA.,
Warsaw and Montreal Conventions. This decision involved plain-
tiffs' motion for reconsideration of the court's dismissal of plain-
tiffs' tort cause of action on the grounds that it was preempted
by the ADA. 58 In their motion for reconsideration, plaintiffs
claimed that because they never actually flew on El Al, the two
days spent in the airport terminal were not related to any airline
services.3 59
The court noted that neither the United States Supreme
Court nor the Second Circuit has provided a definition of "air-
line services," but that the district courts have developed two dis-
tinct methods for making this determination.3 "6 The first line of
cases, exemplified by Trinidad v. American Airlines, Inc., focuses
on whether the actions by airline personnel are "commonplace
and ordinary, and relate directly to travel." '61 If so, the actions
are considered airline services and are preempted. 62
The second approach to ADA preemption was set forth in
Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc.3 63 The first prong of the Rombom
test requires a determination of whether the activity is a ser-
353 Id. at *13.
354 Id.
355 Id. at *14.
356 Id. at *14-15.
357 471 F. Supp. 2d 356 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
358 Id. at 357.
35) Id. at 358.
360 Id. at 359.
361 Id. at 359-60 (citing Trinidad v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 932 F. Supp. 521,
524-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1996)).
362 Id. at 360.
363 Id. at 361 (citing Rombom v. United Air Lines, Inc., 867 F. Supp. 214, 221
(S.D.N.Y. 1994)).
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vice. 3 64 If so, then the court must "ascertain whether the claim
affects the airline service directly or tenuously, remotely or pe-
ripherally;" thus, the court must decide "whether the underlying
tortious conduct was reasonably necessary to the provision of
the service."3 65
Here, the court found that plaintiffs' claims were preempted
under either line of cases, and therefore declined to either pick
an approach or combine the two approaches. 6 6
VIII. AIR TRANSPORTATION SAFETY AND SYSTEM
STABILIZATION ACT
Shortly after September 11, 2001, Congress enacted the Air
Transportation Safety and System Stabilization Act (ATSSSA).367
The ATSSSA created the well-known Victim Compensation
Fund to provide no-fault compensation to victims of the attacks,
and limited the involved air carriers' liability to the limits of
368 1h1TSA lodrcetheir insurance coverage. Part of the ATSSSA also directed
the President to compensate air carriers up to five billion dol-
lars, in the aggregate, for "direct losses" caused by the govern-
ment's orders ceasing air traffic, as well as for "incremental
losses" directly caused by the terrorist attacks of September 11,
2001.369 The ATSSSA also conferred "original and exclusive ju-
risdiction" upon the Southern District of New York over all ac-
tions "resulting from or relating to the terrorist-related aircraft
crashes of September 11, 2001."37 0
A. FEDERAL ExPREss CORP. V. DEPARTMENT
OF TRANSPORTATION
3 7 1
In conjunction with the applications made by airlines for com-
pensation under the ATSSSA for losses caused by the terrorist
attacks, the ATSSSA provided that the alleged losses were to be
proven "to the satisfaction of the President. ' 372 In accordance
364 Id. (quoting Galbut v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 2d 146, 152 (E.D.N.Y.
1997)).
365 Id. (quoting Galbut, 27 F. Supp. 2d at 152).
366 Id. at 359.
367 Fed. Express Corp. v. Dep't of Transp., 434 F.3d 597, 598 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
368 In re World Trade Ctr. Disaster Site Litig., 456 F. Supp. 2d 520, 542
(S.D.N.Y. 2006).
369 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 2007), Fed. Express, 434 F.3d at 598.
370 See, e.g., Troiano v. Mardovich, No. 06 Civ. 523 (LAP), 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55446, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2006).
371 434 F.3d 597 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
372 Id. at 598.
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with that directive, the Secretary of the Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT) promulgated a rule governing submission of re-
quests for compensation under the ATSSSA.3 71 In addition to
assuming that airlines would experience a reduction in revenue,
the regulations forecasted situations where airlines' expenses
would also decrease.7 To address this situation, the DOT
promulgated the "cost savings rule," which provides:
The Department generally does not accept claims by air carriers
that cost savings should be excluded from the calculation of in-
curred losses. Consequently, the Department will generally not
allow such claims to be used in a way that has the effect of in-
creasing the compensation for which an air carrier is eligible. 5
In a petition to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Ap-
peals, Federal Express (FedEx) challenged the "cost savings
rule" promulgated by the DOT as contrary to the ATSSSA and
also challenged the DOT's rejection of FedEx's financial state-
ments as arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Pro-
cedure Act (APA).3 76  The court denied both of FedEx's
challenges. 7
First, the court held that the DOT rule is reasonable and ra-
tional, given the statutory objectives of the ATSSSA and for the
reasons stated in the rulemaking.378 The rule, according to the
court, is reasonable since it effectively and efficiently imple-
mented the ATSSSA's goal of compensating air carriers. 9 In
fact, the system put in place by the DOT ensured that all air
carriers, including FedEx, initially received approximately fifty
percent of their estimated losses, and installment payments were
made later to distribute the rest of their entitled compensa-
tion.3"' Some of the reasons supporting the cost savings rule
included that cost reductions unrelated to September 11 were
373 Id.
374 Id. at 599 (citing Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 67 Fed. Reg.
18,468, 18,472 (Apr. 16, 2002)).
375 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 330.39(b) (2005)).
376 Id. at 598. FedEx's previous challenge to the DOT's ruling was held to be
premature because a "final decision" had not been issued by the DOT regarding
FedEx's compensation claims. See Fed. Express Corp. v. Mineta, 373 F.3d 112,
119-20 (D.C. Cir. 2004) ("FedEx I").
377 Fed. Express, 434 F.3d at 598.
378 Id. at 602 (citing Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 67 Fed. Reg.
18,468, 18,472-73 (Apr. 16, 2002) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 330)).
379 Id.
380 Id. at 599 (citing Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, 66 Fed. Reg.
54,616, 54,617 (Oct. 29, 2001) (to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 330)).
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expected to be incorporated in pre-September 11 forecasts, and
thus were accounted for already."' The rule reduced an air car-
rier's losses, thereby preventing air carriers from receiving un-
warranted increases in compensation. 8 2
Second, the court held that the rejection of FedEx's financial
statements was not arbitrary and capricious under the APA.383
The records were held under seal and were not explicitly dis-
cussed by the court, but the court noted that the affidavits ac-
companying the statements, as well as the statements
themselves, "left significant gaps in relevant information or con-
tained significant inconsistencies and weaknesses that gave the
Secretary reasonable grounds to deny further compensation to
FedEx under the Act. '38 4 Since the only requirement under the
ATSSSA was that the President, and his delegates, were to be
"satisfied," the DOT was entitled to significant deference. 85
FedEx was required to satisfy the DOT by providing adequate
statements and affidavits.3 86
IX. FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT
Traditionally, the principle of sovereign immunity insulates
the United States government from suits for money damages.
However, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) authorizes suits
against the government for money damages for "injury or loss of
property, or personal injury or death caused by the negligent or
wrongful act or omission of any employee of the Government
while acting within the scope of his office or employment. 38 v
The government may be held liable for negligence "in the same
manner and to the same extent as a private individual under
like circumstances. '388
381 Id. (citing Procedures for Compensation of Air Carriers, supra note 379, at
18,473).
382 Id.








A. DISCRETIONARY FUNCTION EXCEPTION
1. Bollinger v. United State s '
Plaintiffs sued the United States, specifically, the Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA), for claims arising out of the crash of
an "amateur-built experimental aircraft."3 " Plaintiffs claimed
that the accident occurred as a "direct and proximate result of
the negligent acts and omissions of the FAA inspector during
the airworthiness inspection and the issuance of the special air-
worthiness certificate." '39 1
The aircraft was constructed by plaintiffs from an aircraft kit
with the assistance of an Experimental Aircraft Association tech-
nical counselor.3 92 Plaintiffs added a fuel injection system, in-
cluding a purge valve that was inappropriate for use in the
aircraft.3 9 It was undisputed that the malfunction of the purge
valve was the cause of the accident. "94 Plaintiffs claimed that
they did not have sufficient expertise to recognize the defect,
but that it would be apparent to any FAA inspector. 95 An FAA
airworthiness inspection was conducted on the aircraft approxi-
mately one and one-half years prior to the crash.396 The exami-
nation included the engine and purge valve.3 97 The FAA
inspector certified that the aircraft met the requirements for air-
worthiness. 9 Subsequently, the owners conducted the FAA re-
quired yearly inspections and no problems were found. 99
Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the lawsuit
was barred by the discretionary function exception of the
FT'CA.400 The court noted at the outset that there is no waiver
of immunity under the FTCA for "claims based upon the exer-
cise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a dis-
cretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an
employee of the Government."4 '' The court then articulated
389 No. CV-06-082-LRS, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84308 (E.D. Wash. Nov. 20,
2006).
390 Id. at *2.
391 Id.
392 Id.
393 Id. at *3.
394 Id. at *5.
395 Id. at *3.
396 Id. at *5.
397 Id. at *4.
398 Id.
399 Id. at *5.
400 Id. at *2-3.
41 Id. at *6 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2006)).
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the two-part test governing application of the discretionary func-
tion exception. 2 First, the challenged conduct must "involve
an element of judgment or choice" and second, the "judgment
[must be] of the kind that the discretionary function exception
was designed to shield."' 40 3
Applying the test, the court found that the FAA inspector's
actions were protected by the discretionary function excep-
tion.404 The court noted that, although "the FAA is authorized
by statute to establish safety regulations, and minimum stan-
dards for the design, construction, and maintenance and inspec-
tion of the aircraft," there are "no published airworthiness
standards for amateur-built experimental aircraft. ' 4 5 Moreover,
"[r] esponsibility for maintaining the airworthiness of an aircraft
rests with the owner."40 6 The court relied heavily on the Su-
preme Court's decision in United States v. Varig Airlines,4 °7 which
held that the "discretionary function exception to the [FTCA]
precluded tort actions based on the [FAA's] alleged negligence
in failing to check certain specific items in the course of certify-
ing certain aircraft for use in commercial aviation."40 8 The
court refused to distinguish the present case from Varig, finding
the owner's responsibility to maintain the airworthiness of ex-
perimental aircraft analogous to the airline's responsibility to in-
spect commercial aircraft.40 9 Accordingly, the discretionary
function exception applied and plaintiffs' claims were
dismissed.410
B. NEGLIGENCE
1. Barnes v. United States4"1
Plaintiff sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims
Act for damages due to a wrist injury she sustained when prepar-
ing to enter airport security. 412 She claimed that Transportation
402 Id. at *7.
403 Id. (quoting Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
404 Id. at *16 (quoting In re Glacier Bay, 71 F.3d 1447, 1451 (9th Cir. 1995)).
405 Id. at *9-10 (citing 49 U.S.C. § 44701(a)(1) (2006); 14 C.F.R. § 91.403(a)
(2006)).
406 Id. at *10 (quoting 14 C.F.R. § 91.403(a) (2006)).
-7 467 U.S. 797 (1984).
408 Bollinger, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84308, at *11-12 (citing Varig Airlines, 467
U.S. at 816).
409 Id. at *13.
410 Id. at *16.
411 No. 3:04-CV-489, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 49629 (E.D. Tenn. July 18, 2006).
412 Id. at *1.
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Safety Administration (TSA) security officers required her to re-
move her shoes before walking through a metal detector and
that because no chair was provided, she lost her balance and
fell. 413 The court granted the TSA's motion for summary judg-
ment on the grounds that (1) there was no duty to provide
plaintiff with a chair; (2) there was no evidence that the cause in
fact of plaintiffs injuries was the absence of a chair; and (3)
there was no evidence that the absence of a chair proximately
caused plaintiff's injuries.4t 4
The court noted that the question was one of duty, specifically
whether "there was any showing from which it can be said that
the defendants reasonably knew or should have known of the
probability of an occurrence such as the one which caused the
plaintiff's injuries. ' 415 The court found that it was not reasona-
bly foreseeable that plaintiff would fall and injure herself while
trying to remove her shoes at the security checkpoint.4"6 The
TSA was not aware of any similar previous incidents, although
thousands of travelers passed through the security checkpoint
daily.417 Moreover, the court noted that there were "no facts
that would have alerted TSA that this particular plaintiff might
be at risk for falling. '41  Accordingly, there was no duty to pro-
vide plaintiff with a chair to facilitate the removal of her
shoes.419
C. WEATHER BRIEFINGS
1. Srock v. United States420
The estate of an airplane passenger who was killed in a crash
brought an action under the FTCA, alleging that a deficient
weather briefing by the FAA caused the crash.42' Plaintiff's de-
cedent was a passenger in an "experimental amateur-built am-
phibious 'Seawind' aircraft" that crashed after entering clouds
in the Cumberland Gap National Historic Park in Virginia.422
413 Id.
414 Id.
415 Id. at *7 (quoting Eaton v. McLain, 891 S.W.2d 587, 594 (Tenn. 2005))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
416 Id. at *7-9.
417 Id. at *8.
418 Id.
419 Id. at *9.
420 462 F. Supp. 2d 812 (E.D. Mich. 2006).
421 Id. at 814.
422 Id. at 815.
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The decedent and the pilot planned to fly the Seawind from
Florida to Michigan on the morning of February 11, 2000.423
The pilot checked the weather by telephone twice that morning,
each time contacting a different Flight Service Station (FSS).494
The pilot first telephoned the FSS in Gainesville, Florida, and
received a "standard" weather briefing, which follows a "pre-
ordained format consisting of certain weather information
presented in a particular order. '425 Ultimately, the briefer ex-
pressed doubt as to whether the pilot could get to Michigan that
day due to the weather conditions.42 6 The briefer noted that the
only possible route would be to fly to central Tennessee and
then continue from there through southern Indiana to
Michigan.427
Instead, the pilot flew to Douglas, Georgia.428 In Douglas, the
pilot telephoned the Macon, Georgia FSS for an additional
weather briefing. 429 The briefer began providing a standard
briefing and sought to obtain necessary background informa-
tion from the pilot.430 The court noted that the pilot was reluc-
tant to provide this important information.4 3' When the briefer
began providing standard weather information, the pilot inter-
rupted her and began asking specific questions.432 The briefer
advised that there was some "light precipitation" along the di-
rect route from Georgia straight up to Michigan. 3
After receiving the second briefing, the plane flew into east-
ern Tennessee in favorable weather conditions.434 The route
took the Seawind over the Great Smokey Mountains into Vir-
ginia.413 5 Beyond the Smokey Mountains, and along the Cum-
berland Mountain Gap, there was a deck of clouds almost one
mile thick.436 The cloud layer would have been clearly visible
for at least ten miles and more likely twenty to forty miles before
423 Id. at 816.
424 Id.
425 Id. at 816-17.
426 Id. at 816.




431 Id. at 818.
432 Id.
433 Id. at 819.




the crash.43 v There was ample opportunity for the pilot to turn
the aircraft around or to land, but he chose to press on through
the cloudy conditions .43  The plane later crashed, killing the
pilot and plaintiffs decedent. 9
The court's analysis began by noting that "'[s]ince the FAA
has undertaken to advise requesting pilots of weather condi-
tions, thus engendering reliance on facilities . . .it is under a
duty to see that the information which it furnishes is accurate
and complete."'' 440 However, the court elaborated that nothing
a flight service specialist does relieves a pilot of his continuing
duty to be aware of danger when he can obtain the information
through his own observation. 44 1 Specifically, "'[i]n conditions
where judgment is exercisable, the decision as to whether and
when weather conditions permit a takeoff is up to the pilot.' '
442
Accordingly, although the FAA owed a duty to the pilot and
the decedent to provide accurate and complete weather infor-
mation, the Macon, Georgia FSS briefer did not breach this
duty.4 4 3 It was undisputed that the pilot controlled the type of
information provided in the briefing and that it was the pilot
who decided what route to fly. 444 The court determined that the
briefer provided all of the pertinent information available to her
and did not breach any duty.4 4 5
Moreover, the briefing, even if deficient, was not the proxi-
mate cause, or even a cause, of the accident. 446 Despite the
warnings given by the Gainesville briefer, the pilot flew towards
eastern Tennessee.447 The court found that "even if [he] had
been given additional warnings and been cautioned to fly a
more westerly path, . . .he would not have heeded them. 448
437 Id.
4 Id. at 821.
439 Id.
440 Id. at 824 (quoting Pierce v. United States, 679 U.S. 617, 621 (6th Cir.
1982)).
441 Id. at 825-26.
442 Id. at 826 (quoting Bauer v. United States, 789 F. Supp. 2d 944, 952 (N.D.
Ill. 2002)).
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D. REMOVAL TO FEDERAL COURT
1. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.44 9
This case arose out of the fatal crash of a Cirrus SR-22 air-
craft.45 ° Plaintiffs sued on behalf of the decedents, asserting
claims for insufficient ground training after plaintiffs purchase
of the aircraft, as well as negligent design and manufacture of
the aircraft.45' The manufacturer, Cirrus Design Corporation
("Cirrus"), filed a third party complaint against two employees
of the Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") Automated
Flight Service Station, alleging that the FAA employees were
negligent in providing weather information to the pilot.452 Cir-
rus sought indemnification and contribution from each em-
ployee if it were found liable.45 3
The United States moved to dismiss the individually named
FAA employees and substitute itself as the sole third-party defen-
dant under the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA") .45 The FTCA
provides exclusive federal jurisdiction in the event of negligence
by government employees during the scope of their employ-
ment.45 5 It is up to the Attorney General to decide if, at the time
when the alleged conduct occurred, the individual employees
were within the scope of their employment with the federal gov-
ernment.4 56 If so, the Attorney General may certify that substitu-
tion of the United States as a defendant is proper.457
Here, the Director of the United States Department of Justice
Civil Torts Branch certified that the individuals were acting
within the scope of their employment at the time of the inci-
dent.4 58 The court found no evidence to the contrary and per-
mitted the substitution of the United States as the sole third-
party defendant. 459
449 No. 06-2661 (PAM/RLE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 91731 (D. Minn. Oct. 24,
2006).
450 Id. at *2.
451 Id. at *3.
452 Id. at *4.
453 Id.
454 Id. at *4-5.
455 Id. at *5.
456 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(1) (2006)).
457 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. §2679(d)(1)).




The court then turned to the question of whether removal
was proper.46 First, the court considered plaintiffs' argument
that the court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the
third-party claims against the United States.46" ' Plaintiffs argued
that under the derivative jurisdiction doctrine, a federal court's
subject matter jurisdiction is derivative of the jurisdiction of the
state court from which the case was removed.462 Thus, although
the federal court may have properly had subject matter jurisdic-
tion if the action was originally filed in federal court, it will lack
jurisdiction on removal if the state court did not have jurisdic-
tion.463 Plaintiffs argued that because the FTCA claims belong
exclusively in federal court, the state courts would lack subject
matter jurisdiction over the third-party claims.464
The court noted that in North Dakota v. Fredericks, the Eighth
Circuit held that a 1985 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1441 elimi-
nated the doctrine of derivative jurisdiction.465 Although the
Eighth Circuit acknowledged that the 1985 amendment only re-
ferred to removals under §1441, it applied the policy underlying
the amendment to other removal statutes and thus completely
abandoned the doctrine.4 66 The court rejected plaintiffs' argu-
ment that Fredericks was no longer good law, or in the alternative,
that a 2002 amendment to § 1441 indicated congressional intent
to limit the abrogation of the derivative jurisdiction doctrine to
removals under § 1441.467 The court noted that all of the deci-
sions relied upon by plaintiffs were from outside the Eighth Cir-
cuit, but the Glorvigen court was bound to apply the decision in
Fredericks as the law of the Eighth Circuit.46 Additionally, the
court found that there was no indication that Congress intended
to overturn the complete abandonment of the derivative juris-
diction doctrine. 469 Finally, the court held that "applying the
derivative jurisdiction doctrine to removals only under § 1441
would create arbitrary inconsistencies in determinations of sub-
460 Id.
461 Id.
462 Id. at *8 (citing Lambert Run Coal Co. v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 258 U.S. 377,
382 (1922)).
463 Id. (citing Lambert, 258 U.S. at 382).
464 Id.
465 Id. (citing North Dakota v. Fredericks, 940 F.2d 333, 336 (8th Cir. 1991)).
466 Id. (citing Fredericks, 940 F.3d at 337-38).
467 Id. at *10, 12 (citing Barnaby v. Quintos, 410 F. Supp. 2d 142, 146 (S.D.N.Y.
2005)).
468 Id. at *12.
469 Id. at *12-13.
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ject matter jurisdiction. '470 Accordingly, the court found that
subject matter jurisdiction existed over the third-party claims as
a result of its continued adherence to the abrogation of the de-
rivative jurisdiction doctrine. 47 1
The court then considered whether it had subject matter ju-
risdiction over the third-party indemnification and contribution
claims. With regard to the indemnification claims, the court
concluded that plaintiffs were essentially contending that the
defendant/third-party plaintiff failed to state a claim upon
which relief could be granted.472 If this was so, the proper rem-
edy was dismissal on the merits, which could occur only after the
court invoked jurisdiction.473 With regard to the contribution
claims, the court found that both Minnesota Rules and the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure allowed a third-party plaintiff to
implead a person who is or may be liable to the third-party plain-
tiff.4 7 4 Accordingly, the court rejected plaintiffs' argument that
these claims were not ripe for review.475
Finally, the court considered plaintiffs' request to sever and
remand the state law claims but retain jurisdiction over the
third-party claims.4 76 The court declined this request, finding
that the complaint and the third-party complaint revolved
around the same injury and the same series of events.47 7 Policy
considerations such as judicial economy warranted the disposi-
tion of all claims together.47" Further, the United States, as the
third-party defendant, should be allowed the opportunity to
elicit facts on issues of liability and comparative fault.479 Finally,
it was unfair to force defendant to litigate two separate lawsuits
when all issues could be addressed efficiently in one action.48 0
X. FEDERAL AVIATION ACT OF 1958
The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 (the Act) authorizes the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to enact Federal Avia-
470 Id. at *13 (citing Fredericks, 940 F.3d at 337).
471 Id. at *13-14.
472 Id. at *16-17.
473 Id. at *17.
474 Id. at *18 (quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 14; MINN. R. 14.01 (2006)).
475 Id. at *18.
476 Id. at *20.
477 Id.
478 Id.
479 Id. (citing Kan. Pub. Employees Ret. Sys. v. Reimer & Kroger Assocs., Inc., 4
F.3d 614, 620 (8th Cir. 1993)).
480 Id. at *20-21.
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tion Regulations (FAR). 481 The Act provides federal jurisdiction
for injunctive relief for a violation of the Act or a FAR, but there
is no express or implied private right of action under the Act.48 2
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
1. Duvall v. AVCO Corp.483
Plaintiffs asserted product liability, negligence, and wrongful
death claims arising out of the crash of a Cessna aircraft which
resulted in the death of the pilot and two passengers. 4 4 Defend-
ants included the manufacturers of the aircraft, the engine, the
fuel servo, and the fuel pump.4 5 Plaintiffs claimed that the acci-
dent was caused by the malfunction of the aircraft's engine and
fuel servo.486
Defendants moved to dismiss on the grounds that federal law
preempts the entire field of aviation safety, which includes air-
craft design and certification, relying on the Third Circuit's de-
cision in Abdullah v. American Airlines, Inc.4 7 The court agreed,
finding that "the Third Circuit did not limit its holding to pilot-
ing or aircraft operation, and specifically rejected the approach
adopted by other courts that found only certain aspects of avia-
tion safety to be preempted."'4 8 The clear language of Abdullah
indicates that the Third Circuit intended to preempt the entire
field of aviation safety, and did not want to limit preemption to
just piloting or operation.48 9 Accordingly, the action was
dismissed.490
2. Monroe v. Cessna Aircraft Co.491
Plaintiffs claims arose out of the crash of a Cessna 172S air-
craft in which the pilot and a passenger were killed.492 The
crash was caused by structural damage after a collision between
481 See Montauk-Caribbean Airways, Inc. v. Hope, 784 F.2d 91, 97 (2d Cir.
1986).
482 See, e.g., id.
483 No. 4:CV 05-1786, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 31445 (M.D. Pa. May 19, 2006).
484 Id. at *3-4.
485 Id. at *4.
486 Id.
487 Id. at *7 (quoting Abdullah v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 181 F.3d 363, 365 (3d Cir.
1999)).
488 Id. at *8 (quoting Abdullah, 181 F.3d at 365).
489 Id.
490 Id. at *8-9.
491 417 F. Supp. 2d 824 (E.D. Tex. 2006).
492 Id. at 826.
2007] 255
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
a bird and the aircraft.49 3 Plaintiff filed this wrongful death and
survivor action alleging causes of action in both negligence and
strict products liability in relation to bird collisions and the re-
sultant structural damage under theories of failure to warn and
inadequate design.4 94
Defendant challenged plaintiffs claims on the grounds that
they were impliedly preempted by the Federal Aviation Act (the
Act). 4  The court noted that implied preemption requires a
finding that Congress intended the federal government to ex-
clusively occupy the field.496 Yet, "[N]either the Supreme Court
nor the Fifth Circuit have held that [the Act] preempts the en-
tire field of aviation safety. '4 97 Moreover, the court found that
there was no legislative intent by Congress to preempt or occupy
the entire field of aviation safety. 498 Rather, the legislative his-
tory and text of the Act shows that state law tort claims may still
be alleged and were not preempted.4 99
In evaluating whether Congress intended to preempt the avia-
tion safety field, the court found a "lack of a pervasive and pre-
cise regulatory scheme. ' 50 0 The court explained that the FAA's
three phase certification process for aircraft does not create
such a pervasive regulatory scheme because it does not itself set
forth safety and design standards. 51 The certification process
merely allows the FAA to monitor the aircraft's compliance with
other regulations.50 2 The FAA regulations that do control the
safety and design of an aircraft are broad and leave significant
discretion to the manufacturer; thus, the court found that there
was not a pervasive scheme of regulation. 50 ' The court also
noted that "the specific lack of bird strike regulations related to
the Cessna Model 172S demonstrates the absence of a pervasive




494 Id. at 826-27.
495 Id.
496 Id. at 828 (quoting English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 79 (1990)).
497 Id.
498 Id. at 830.
499 Id.
500 Id. at 832-33.
50, Id. at 833.
502 Id.
503 Id.
504 Id. at 834.
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The court recognized that the circuit courts are split as to
whether the field of aviation safety is preempted by the Act.50 5
The court explained that the Third Circuit expressly held, in
Abdullah v. American Airlines,5 °6 that federal law preempts the en-
tire field of aviation safety.5 7 However, in Cleveland v. Piper Air-
craft Corp.,5°8 the Tenth Circuit held that "Congress did not
indicate a 'clear and manifest intent to occupy the field of air-
plane safety to the exclusion of state common law."' 50 9 Accord-
ing to the Monroe court, the facts of this case were akin to those
in Cleveland, where an individual sued an aircraft manufacturer
for negligent design.510 Abdullah, on the other hand, involved
claims brought by commercial airline passengers against a com-
mercial airline for personal injury.5t ' Therefore, the court
adopted the Tenth Circuit's holding and found that the field of
aviation safety was not preempted by the Act.512
3. Yarbrough v. AVCO Corp.513
Plaintiffs' claims arose out of the crash of a Piper PA 18-150
aircraft in which both the pilot and passenger on board were
killed.51 4 Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated the Tennes-
see Products Liability Act when they designed and manufac-
tured the engine and carburetor, including installation.51 5
Defendants removed the case to federal court asserting that the
court had original jurisdiction over plaintiffs' claims.5 16 Specifi-
cally, defendants argued that plaintiffs' claims were preempted
because the FAA certified that the plane's engine and carbure-
tor satisfied the FAA regulations.517
The court noted that only complete preemption is relevant at
the removal stage of the proceedings.518 Therefore, the court
disregarded any arguments regarding federal preemption as a
505 Id.
50- 181 F.3d 363 (3d Cir. 1999).
507 Monroe, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
508 985 F.2d 1438 (10th Cir. 1993).
509 Id. at 1442 (quoting Piper Aircraft Corp., 985 F.2d at 1444).
510 Monroe, 417 F. Supp. 2d at 835.
511 Id.
512 Id. at 835-36.
51 No. 3:06-0730, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 74102 (M.D. Tenn. Oct. 10, 2006).
514 Id. at *2.
515 Id.
516 Id. at *3.
517 Id.
518 Id. at *9-10.
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defense. 5 9 The court explained that complete preemption oc-
curs when "'the preemptive force of a statute is so extraordinary
that it converts an ordinary state common-law complaint into
one stating a federal claim for the purposes of the well-pleaded
complaint rule."'5' 20 Once an area of law has been completely
preempted, any claim based on the preempted state law is con-
sidered to arise under federal law and federal jurisdiction is
proper.52' The court found that defendants based their pre-
emption-related claims on cases that discussed the defense of
federal field preemption, not the doctrine of complete preemp-
tion.522 The court determined that these cases were inapplica-
ble at the remand stage of the proceedings because defendants
did not assert complete preemption and provided no support
for the application of the doctrine. 523 Accordingly, the court
found no basis for removal.524
4. Drake v. Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings525
A former flight attendant who was terminated from his em-
ployment for failing a drug test sued laboratories and other per-
sons involved in the allegedly faulty testing.526 Plaintiff had
been terminated from his employment by Delta Airlines
("Delta") because airline officials thought he failed a federally
required drug test.5 27 Plaintiff contended that the tests were car-
ried out in a way contrary to both industry standards and federal
regulations.528
In arriving at its decision, the court set forth a two-step analy-
sis to ascertain if preemption will be applied to a state law
claim.529 First, state law is preempted if it "covers the subject
matter" of the federal rule. 530 Thus, when a specific portion of
the FAA regulations is addressed by a state law, that state law is
preempted.531 Second, "state law is preempted if it 'cover[s] the
519 Id. at *11.
520 Id. (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 782 U.S. 386, 393 (1987)).
521 Id.
522 Id. at *13.
523 Id. at *13-14.
524 Id.
525 458 F.3d 48 (2d Cir. 2006).
526 Id. at 51.
527 Id.
528 Id.
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subject matter of drug... testing of aviation personnel perform-
ing safety-sensitive functions. ' "1532 As a result, some state laws
may "cover the subject matter" of the drug testing of aviation
personnel even if they regulate issues not specifically addressed
by the FAA regulations. 5-- However, for such laws to be pre-
empted, their relationship to such drug testing must be "so sub-
stantial as to interfere with the consistency and uniformity of the
federal regulatory scheme. '534 The Drake court considered the
FAA regulations regarding drug testing of aviation industry em-
ployees, noting that the regulations provide detailed guidance
regarding what must be included in drug testing programs. 5
However, the FAA regulations do not specifically address labora-
tory negligence, nor do they establish a minimum standard of
care for laboratory employees. 6
The court applied this analysis to plaintiffs claims and found
that plaintiff relied only on state common law to provide a rem-
edy for violation of the federal regulations 7.5 " Because the FAA
regulations do not address remedies, the court held that state
law did not cover the subject matter of the regulations and was
therefore not preempted.53 8 As none of plaintiff's causes of ac-
tion were based entirely on preempted state law, the court al-
lowed the claims to proceed.53 9
5. McMahon Helicopter Services, Inc. v. United States54
Plaintiff, McMahon Helicopter Services, sued the United
States, Wayne County Airport Authority ("the Airport Author-
ity"), and other defendants seeking a recovery for damages sus-
tained to plaintiffs helicopter when it hit a light pole on the
Airport Authority's property. 54 1 The Airport Authority had in-
stalled the light pole in 1986 or 1987.542 The pole at issue was
one of six sixty-five-foot poles installed next to the south cargo




535 Id. at 56.
536 Id. at 57.
537 Id. at 63-64.
538 Id. at 64.
539 Id. at 66.
540 No. 04-74133, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 51819 (E.D. Mich. July 28, 2006).
541 Id. at *2.
542 Id. at *6.
543 Id.
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lights stopped functioning during the 1990s, they were never re-
moved. 5" On December 22, 2003, McMahon's helicopter
struck one of the poles while attempting to land.545 As a result,
the helicopter sustained significant damage.546
Plaintiff contended that the Airport Authority breached its
duty of care by allowing the inoperative light poles to stay in
place without informing airport users of their presence. 547 De-
fendants argued that such claims were preempted because the
FAA regulates potential obstructions in airspace under 14 C.F.R.
77, which requires that the FAA and the airport conduct a re-
view of potential obstructions for any new construction or altera-
tion.548 Such a review of the six light poles was conducted
annually.549 At all times, the poles were found to be in compli-
ance with the regulations and were not deemed to be
obstructions.550
The court agreed with the Airport Authority, finding that
there are specific federal regulations governing obstructions in
navigable air space and that the FAA had specifically considered
the light pole at issue and found it not to be an obstruction.
Further, the FAA had full authority for civil aeronautics, which
includes the promulgation and enforcement of safety regula-
tions. 552 Thus, the court held that the FAA establishes the stan-
dard of care and preempts the field.553
6. Center for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. City of Honolulu55 4
Plaintiff, an advocacy group, sued the City and County of
Honolulu seeking declaratory judgment and a preliminary in-
junction to prevent enforcement of an ordinance prohibiting
aerial tow-banners.55  Plaintiff alleged that federal law pre-
empted enforcement of the municipal ordinance. 6
544 Id.
545 Id. at *10-11.
546 Id. at *11.
547 Id. at *21.
548 Id. at *9, *21.
549 Id. at *9.
550 Id. at *9-10.
551 Id. at *27.
552 Id. at*23, *27.
553 Id. at *27.
554 455 F.3d 910 (9th Cir. 2006).




FAA regulations do not allow civilian aircraft to operate over
densely populated areas, and require a certificate of authoriza-
tion to operate in such airspace. 55 7 Before towing its banners,
plaintiff obtained a certificate from the FAA authorizing aerial
banner towing in the designated area.55' The certificate stated
that it "does not constitute a waiver of any State law or local
ordinance. 5 59
The City and County of Honolulu, as part of a well-established
system regulating outdoor advertising with the goal of protect-
ing the scenic landscape, passed an ordinance banning aerial
tow banners.56 ° Plaintiff sought to prohibit enforcement of the
ordinance, arguing that the FAA "occupies the entire field of
tow banner regulation" and, therefore, the ordinance conflicted
with the FAA certificate of authorization.5 6 ' The court rejected
plaintiffs argument, relying on Skysign International, Inc. v. City
of Honolulu,562 a Ninth Circuit case involving a nearly identical
challenge based on federal preemption.563 The court held that
Congress and the FAA did not exert their statutory authority to
such a degree that it would constitute field preemption.564 Even
though Congress authorized the FAA to develop applicable reg-
ulations, the court found that there was no affirmative indica-
tion that the FAA sought to fully occupy the field of aerial
advertising. 56 5  Accordingly, the ordinance was not
preempted.566
7. Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design Corp.567
Plaintiffs complaint arose out of the crash of a Cirrus SR-22
aircraft, resulting in the death of the pilot and the sole passen-
ger.561 Defendant, Cirrus Design Corporation ("Cirrus"), sold




560 Id. at 915.
561 Id. at 917,
562 276 F.3d 1109 (9th Cir. 2002).




567 No. 05-2137 (PAM/RLE), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8741 (D. Minn. Feb. 16,
2006).
568 Id. at *2.
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aircraft. 69 Plaintiff claimed that Cirrus failed to provide the pi-
lot with enough training to operate the SR-22.570 Specifically,
plaintiff charged that Cirrus did not include instruction on in-
strument flight rules operations, which would have trained the
pilot on procedures to follow in marginal weather conditions.57
Cirrus removed the action to federal court on the grounds that
plaintiff's claims involved federal issues.572 Alternatively, Cirrus
argued that the Federal Aviation Act completely preempted any
state-law claim based on the failure to provide adequate pilot
training, justifying federal question jurisdiction.5
The court first considered whether plaintiff's claims raised sig-
nificant federal issues. 574 The question was "whether a state-law
claim raises a federal issue, 'actually disputed and substantial,'
which the Court may address 'without disturbing any congressio-
nally approved balance of federal and state judicial responsibili-
ties.' '5 7 5 The court noted that federal question jurisdiction
requires that the federal issue be "dispositive and 'at the heart of
the state-law . . . claim.' ,576 Although the case implicated the
Act and its regulations, the court found this was not dispositive
as to whether plaintiff could maintain a claim under state law.577
Moreover, the fact that Congress did not provide a federal cause
of action or preempt state remedies within the Act suggested to
the court that "Congress did not intend to create a substantial
federal question over cases implicating the FAA .... ,5 Thus,
the court found no federal question jurisdiction in these cases
because they did not raise a significant enough federal issue. 5 79
The court then turned to preemption. 5s0 Because the ques-
tion at issue was whether removal was proper under the doctrine
of complete preemption, the inquiry was whether the federal
statute provided both substantive and remedial provisions and
clearly indicated that the remedial provision was the exclusive
569 Id.
570 Id.
571 Id. at *2-3.
572 Id. at *3.
573 Id.
574 Id. at *5.
575 Id. at *5-6 (quoting Grable & Sons Metal Prods. v. Darue Eng'g & Mfg., 545
U.S. 308, 314 (2005)).
576 Id. at *8 (quoting Grable, 545 U.S. at 320).
577 Id.
578 Id. at *8-9.




remedy.58 However, the focus of the FAA was not to provide a
remedy for injuries caused by safety violations, but rather to pro-
vide safety standards for pilots and aircraft.582 Therefore, com-
plete preemption did not apply because the FAA did not
provide an express remedy for a violation. 83
B. No-FLY LIST
1. Ibrahim v. Department of Homeland Security84
While checking-in at the United Airlines ticket counter at San
Francisco International Airport, plaintiff was identified as a per-
son on the "No-Fly List."5 5 After the initial identification, a se-
ries of phone calls were made to confirm her identity as a
person on the No-Fly List, which concluded with an agent of the
federal government ordering plaintiffs detention.58 6 She was
handcuffed and escorted out of the airport to a San Francisco
police station.587 She remained in police custody for over two
hours, during which several officers questioned and searched
her.5 8 The Federal Bureau of Investigation ordered her re-
lease. 589 The following day, plaintiff again began her journey
and was put through heightened screening at each stop on the
trip.590 After arriving at her destination, plaintiffs student visa
was taken away by the United States Embassy.591
Plaintiff sued various departments and federal government of-
ficials, including the Department of Homeland Security (the
"federal defendants"), the City of San Francisco, its airport, and
its police department (the "San Francisco defendants"), and
United Airlines, Inc. ("United").592 Her claims challenged the
constitutionality of the "No-Fly List" and her arrest and
interrogation.59 3
581 Id. at *18-19.
582 Id. at *13.
583 Id. at *19.
584 No. C 06-00545 WHA, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60978 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 16,
2006).
585 Id. at *9-10.
586 Id. at *10.
587 Id.
588 Id.
589 Id. at *11.
590 Id.
591 Id. at *12.
592 Id.
593 Id. at *13.
2007] 263
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
All defendants, with the exception of the San Francisco de-
fendants, filed motions to dismiss. 594 The court relied upon
Green v. Transportation Security Administration595 in ruling upon
plaintiffs constitutional challenges to the No-Fly List.59 6 Like
the Green court, the court here dismissed plaintiffs challenges to
the No-Fly List since TSA orders, such as the No-Fly List, are
subject to special review procedures that divest the district
courts of jurisdiction. 9 7
Plaintiff's claims against United and the federal defendants
were dismissed for failure to state a claim.598 The court held
that United's alleged conduct consisted of initially identifying
plaintiffs name on the No-Fly List and calling the police.599
These actions were insufficient to establish a violation of Califor-
nia tort law or 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which creates a private right of
action against state actors for the violation of civil rights under
the U.S. Constitution.600 Under state law, United enjoyed an un-
qualified privilege for reporting possible criminal conduct, and
plaintiff failed to prove an exception to that privilege by show-
ing that the communication was made with malice or animus.6 10'
The section 1983 claim was insufficient because private persons
compelled to act at the government's behest are not liable un-
less some independent motive or hostility is proven, and plain-
tiff did not make such a showing.60 2 Similarly, the federal
defendants' conduct was insufficient to hold them liable under
section 1983, as there was no proof that they acted in concert
with state officials or otherwise under the color of state law. 603
Moreover, plaintiff could not maintain state law causes of action
against the federal defendants.60 4
XI. FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION
AUTHORIZATION ACT OF 1994
The Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of
1994 prevents a state from enacting or enforcing a "law, regula-
594 Id. at *14.
595 351 F. Supp. 2d 1119 (W.D. Wash. 2005).
596 Ibrahim, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 60978, at *18-20.
597 Id. at *18-20.
598 Id. at *40, *42.
599 Id. at *37.
600 Id. at *37, *41.
601 Id. at *38.
602 Id. at *39-40.
603 Id. at *41-42.
604 Id. at *42.
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tion, or other provision having the force and effect of law re-
lated to a price, route, or service of an air carrier or carrier
affiliated with a direct air carrier through common controlling
ownership when such carrier is transporting property by aircraft
or by motor vehicle .... 65
A. FEDERAL PREEMPTION
1. New Hampshire Motor Transport Association v. Rowe 6
Plaintiffs, trade associations representing air and motor carri-
ers, challenged Maine's Tobacco Delivery Law, alleging that
some of the law's provisions were preempted by the Federal Avi-
ation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 ("FAAAA"). 6 °7
Plaintiffs challenged two provisions of the Tobacco Delivery
Law.6" 8 The first, section 1555-C, required a retailer who sells
tobacco products directly to consumers to use a carrier that will
make certain that:
(1) the purchaser of the tobacco products is the same person as
the addressee of the package;
(2) the addressee is of legal age to purchase tobacco products
and sign for the package; and,
(3) if the addressee is under 27 years of age, that she show a
valid government-issued identification verifying that she is old
enough to purchase tobacco products.6" 9
The second provision, section 1555-D, made it illegal to know-
ingly give tobacco products to a consumer in Maine if the to-
bacco products were bought from an unlicensed retailer.610
This provision also stated that a delivery person was "deemed to
know" that a package contained tobacco if it "(1) so indicates on
any side other than the side directly opposite the label, [citation
omitted], or (2) was shipped by a person listed by the Attorney
General as an unlicensed tobacco retailer."6"'
The court noted that the text of the FAAAA preemption pro-
vision was modeled after the preemption provision of the Air-
line Deregulation Act (ADA), and, thus, the court relied on
decisions interpreting that provision.6 12 The court adopted the
65 49 U.S.C.A. § 41713(b) (4) (A) (West 1997).
606 448 F.3d 66 (1st Cir. 2006).
607 Id. at 69.
608 Id. at 69-70.
609 Id. at 70; ME. RE%,. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1555-C(3) (C) (2004).
61o Rowe, 448 F.3d at 70.
61l Tit. 22, § 1555-D; Rowe, 448 F.3d at 70.
612 Rowe, 448 F.3d at 75.
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Supreme Court's definition of "relating to" in the ADA context
and held that the FAAAA preempts any state law that has a con-
nection with or reference to a carrier's rates, routes, or ser-
vices.613 The proper focus under the FAAAA, as under the ADA,
is "on the effect that a state law has on carrier operations, not on
the state's purpose for enacting the law."
614
Applying this analysis, the court concluded that the first chal-
lenged provision of the Tobacco Delivery Law, section 1555-C,
"related to" carrier services and was therefore preempted under
the FAAAA. 615 The court rejected the state Attorney General's
argument that state law must impose a direct regulation on car-
riers for there to be preemption under FAAAA.616 This inter-
pretation was inconsistent both with the "related to" language of
the statute and the FAAAA's purpose to prohibit states from po-
licing carrier operations.617 The court also rejected the Attor-
ney General's alternative argument that there was no
preemption because a carrier could choose not to deliver to-
bacco products in Maine. 618 Again, this rationale was inconsis-
tent with the goal of the FAAAA to establish an atmosphere in
which market forces, rather than state regulatory schemes, drive
carrier operations.6 19
The court next considered whether the section 1555-D ban
on knowingly delivering tobacco products purchased from unli-
censed retailers was preempted by the FAAAA. 620 The court
found that because this provision did not compel carriers to al-
ter their delivery methods, its effect on services was too weak to
justify preemption. 621 Accordingly, the first part of this provi-
sion was not preempted.622 However, while Maine was permit-
ted to ban a carrier from "knowingly transporting contraband
tobacco products," it was not permitted to determine the proce-
dures that carriers should use to locate these products in a deliv-
ery chain.6 23 The imposition of constructive knowledge upon a
carrier if the package was "marked as containing tobacco or if
61 Id. at 78.
614 Id. at 77.
615 Id. at 78-80.
616 Id. at 79.
617 Id.





623 Id. at 81.
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the seller's name appears on the Attorney General's list," imper-
missibly affected carrier services.624 Compliance with this provi-
sion would require deviations from standard delivery procedure
and thus improperly. "relates to" carrier services.625 Thus, the
second part of section 1555-D was preempted.626
XII. GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT
The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994627 (GARA)
sought to address concerns regarding the costs of tort claims
upon manufacturers of general aviation aircraft.6 28 GARA im-
poses an eighteen-year statute of repose with respect to product
liability claims involving general aviation aircraft.6 29
A. SHEESLEY V. CESSNA ARCRAFT Co.630
The pilot and two passengers were killed on August 22, 2000,
during the crash of a Cessna 340A shortly after takeoff from
Rapid City, South Dakota.631 The airplane was manufactured in
1977 and underwent a RAM Series IV upgrade in 1986 that in-
creased the horsepower.63 2 The wastegate elbow on the exhaust
of the left engine was exchanged with a new part.633 Although
disputed, the engine log indicated that the wastegate was manu-
factured by Cessna.634
Plaintiffs filed three actions in the United States District Court
for the District of South Dakota, which were consolidated.6 35
According to plaintiff, a crack in the left wastegate elbow caused
the accident.63 6 The crack enabled hot exhaust to leak from the
wastegate elbow and heat a firewall, behind which a fuel line was
located. 7 The heat from the firewall allegedly vaporized the
fuel in the fuel line, causing the left engine to stall, resulting in
624 Id.
625 Id.
626 Id. at 81-82.
627 49 U.S.C.A. § 40101 (West 1997 & Supp. 2007).
628 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 3(3),
108 Stat. 1552 (2004).
629 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, at 1 (1994).
630 No. 02-4185-KES, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27133 (D.S.D. Apr. 20, 2006).
631 Id. at *7, *10.
632 Id. at *7.
633 Id.
634 Id. at *7-8.
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the crash.63 Defendants contended that pilot error was the sole
cause of the accident. 63
9
Cessna and Teledyne moved for summary judgment contend-
ing that GARA's eighteen year statute of repose barred plain-
tiffs' claims.640 Cessna argued that the GARA repose period
began in 1977, when the airplane was delivered to its first pur-
chaser.641 Plaintiffs countered that the repose period restafted
in 1986, during the replacement of the left engine wastegate el-
bow. 6 4 2 Plaintiffs also argued for application of the "knowing
misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding exception"
within GARA.
6 43
The court noted that under "'GARA § 2(a) (2), a new eigh-
teen year period begins when a new part is added to an aircraft
if this part is alleged to have caused an accident.' ,6 44 The court
held that under this rolling repose provision, the repose period
rolled in 1986, when the new wastegate was replaced, and that
the crash therefore occurred within the repose period.645 The
court made clear, however, that the "rolling repose provision
only applie [d] in this case if the new wastegate valve caused the
crash. ' 64 6 The court also held that questions of fact existed as to
whether Cessna manufactured the wastegate elbow and rejected
plaintiffs' argument that, even if Cessna was not the actual man-
ufacturer of the part, it should be deemed the manufacturer
under federal regulations because it owned the type certificate
for the exhaust system.647
Relying on an unpublished Ninth Circuit opinion, LaHaye v.
Galvin Flying Serv., Inc.,648 Cessna also argued that plaintiffs' de-
fective design claims were barred under GARA because the de-
sign of the wastegate elbow was over eighteen years old. 649 The
638 Id.
639 Id.
640 Id. at *13.
641 Id. at *15.
642 Id.
643 Id.; General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298,
§ 2(b)(1), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
644 Sheesley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27133, at *16 (quoting Robinson v. Hartzell
Propeller Inc., 326 F. Supp. 2d 631, 660 (E.D. Pa. 2004)).
645 Id. at *19.
646 Id. at *18.
647 Id. at *18-19. Under Federal Aviation Regulations, the FAA issues a type
certificate to the manufacturer approved design. See 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.24, 21.31,
21.41 (2006).
648 144 F. App'x. 631 (9th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1019 (2006).
649 Sheesley, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27133, at *23.
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court rejected this argument, stating the LaHaye decision is "un-
persuasive" as it "provided no rationale or reasoning to support
its conclusory finding that GARA's rolling provision requires a
substantive design alteration within the [eighteen] years preced-
ing the accident. 650
The court found that GARA's "misrepresentation, conceal-
ment, or withholding exception" did not apply because plaintiffs
"presented no evidence indicating that Cessna misrepresented,
concealed, or withheld information from the FAA." 651
As to Teledyne's motion, the court agreed that plaintiffs'
claims were barred by GARA since the subject engine was deliv-
ered to its first customer in 1975.652 The court also rejected
plaintiffs' argument that Teledyne should be considered a
"manufacturer" of the wastegate elbow based solely on the fact
that it held a type certificate for this part.6 53
B. CROMAN CoRp. V. GENERAL ELECTRIC Co. 6 5 4
A Sikorsky S-16A helicopter owned by plaintiff, Croman
Corp., crashed near Lakehead, California on March 26, 2002,
following an apparent loss of power in one of its engines.655 As a
result, plaintiff commenced an action seeking to recover dam-
ages under theories of strict products liability, negligence, and
breach of express and implied warranties.656
General Electric, the manufacturer of the helicopter's turbine
engine and other components, and Sikorsky Aircraft Corpora-
tion and United Technologies Corporation, the designer and
manufacturer of the helicopter, moved for summary judgment
on the grounds that plaintiff's claims were barred by GARA. 6 57
The helicopter was delivered to its first customer in 1987, and
the engine in question was purchased by plaintiff in 1977.68
Thus, it was undisputed that delivery of the helicopter and its
parts occurred at least eighteen years prior to the accident.659
650 Id. at *24.
351 Id. at *28.
652 Id. at *35.
653 Id. at *37.
654 No. 2:05-cv-0575-GEB-JFM, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82391 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 2,
2006).
655 Id. at *3.
656 Id. at *4.
657 Id.
658 Id. at *6-7.
659 Id. at *7.
20071 269
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
To establish that GARA applied, defendants had the burden
of demonstrating that the helicopter qualified as a "general avia-
tion aircraft," meaning that it had a maximum seating capacity
of under twenty passengers when the FAA airworthiness certifi-
cate or type certificate was originally issued, and that the aircraft
was not "engaged in scheduled passenger-carry operations"
when the accident occurred.66 ° The parties disputed which FAA
airworthiness certificate was relevant for determining the heli-
copter's seating capacity. 661 Plaintiff argued for utilizing the
first airworthiness certificate, which was issued in 1962 in the
"experimental" category and did not contain a designation as to
the number of passengers.662 GE and Sikorsky, on the other
hand, argued that a subsequent airworthiness certificate issued
in 1967 was controlling. 663 The certificate issued in 1967 listed
the classification as "restricted. '664 The certificate was limited to
the "[t]ransportation of cargo in the furtherance of operators'
or lessees' business only," and thus did not allow for the trans-
port of passengers. 5 Plaintiff asserted that the first airworthi-
ness certificate issued is the only certificate relevant to the
GARA inquiry.666
Under GARA, "general aviation aircraft" means "any aircraft
for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certificate has
been issued by ... [the FAA], which, at the time such certificate
was originally issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer
than 20 passengers .... ,6 The court concluded that, in accor-
dance with the applicable FAA Order,668 the definition of "origi-
nal," as respects the issuance of airworthiness certificates,
includes the scenario where an aircraft is issued a subsequent
airworthiness certificate in another classification 669 Accord-
ingly, the 1967 airworthiness certificate was deemed control-
660 Id.; General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(c),
108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
661 Croman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82391, at *8-9.
662 Id. at *8, *10.




667 General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(c),
108 Stat. 1552 (1994).
668 Fed. Aviation Admin., Order No. 8130.2F, Airworthiness Certification of
Aircraft and Related Products (2005).
669 Croman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82391, at *9.
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ling.6 7' As such, the aircraft was deemed a general aviation
aircraft for purposes of GARA. 671
Plaintiff further argued that GARA did not protect GE be-
cause the engine that allegedly caused the accident was first in-
stalled in a helicopter that was not a general aviation aircraft.6 72
In fact, the engine was purchased for installation in another he-
licopter, which had a maximum seating capacity of thirty-nine
passengers.6 73 Additionally, plaintiff contended that the fuel
manifold at issue was first installed in a non-general aviation air-
craft.674 Plaintiff argued that GE "cannot acquire GARA protec-
tion by virtue of subsequent installation on some other aircraft
* . ,"675 In response, GE argued that the relevant inquiry was the
status of the aircraft or its components at the time of the acci-
dent, not at the time of delivery.676
Citing Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc.,6 77 the court held
that the "relevant focus under GARA when determining
whether an aircraft meets the definition of a 'general aviation
aircraft' is the accident aircraft; not other aircrafts in which the
engine or other components were previously installed. 6 78 Ac-
cordingly, the claims against the manufacturers were
dismissed.6 79
XIII. FORUM NON COVENIENS
The forum non conveniens doctrine is used by courts to decline
jurisdiction even where there is subject matter jurisdiction and
personal jurisdiction, and venue is otherwise proper in the
case.6"' To obtain dismissal under the doctrine, the moving
party must show that an adequate alternative forum is available,
that the "public" and "private" interest factors weigh in favor of
dismissal, and that the plaintiff can reinstate the suit in the alter-
native forum without undue inconvenience or prejudice.68 ' The
"public" interest factors include administrative difficulties due
670 Id. at *10.
671 Id.
672 Id. at *13.




677 283 F.3d 1107, 1112 (9th Cir. 2002).
678 Croman, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82391, at *16.
679 Id. at *28.
660 Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 504 (1947).
68 Id. at 506-09.
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to court congestion, the burden of jury duty on a community
with no relation to the litigation, interest in having localized
controversies decided at home, and litigation in a forum famil-
iar with the applicable law.682 The "private" factors include the
accessibility to sources of proof, the availability of process to
compel unwilling witnesses to attend, the costs incurred from
the attendance of willing witnesses, and the enforceability of any
judgment obtained.6"'
A. DA RocHA v. BELL HELICOPTER TEXTRON, INC.68 4
Plaintiffs' claims arose out of the crash of a helicopter in the
Amazon rain forest of Brazil that resulted in personal injuries
and death to the passengers.685 The helicopter was registered in
Brazil and was operated by a privately owned Brazilian com-
pany.686 It had been manufactured by Bell Helicopter, a Dela-
ware corporation headquartered in Texas.687 The engine was
manufactured by Rolls Royce, a Delaware corporation with its
principal place of business in Indiana. 688 Bell Helicopter de-
signed the aircraft in Texas and Canada, and the engine was
designed, manufactured, and tested in Indiana.68 9 Almost all of
the relevant witnesses and all of the documents concerning the
design, manufacture, and testing of the helicopter and engine
were located in Texas, Indianapolis, and Canada.69 ° Plaintiffs
brought suit in the Southern District of Florida and defendants
sought dismissal on the grounds of forum non conveniens.6 91
The court first considered the availability of an adequate alter-
native forum, noting that the availability requirement is gener-
ally satisfied if the defendant is "amenable to process in the
other jurisdiction. '692 Bell Helicopter and Rolls Royce stipu-
lated that they would submit to the jurisdiction of the Brazilian
682 Id. at 508-509.
-3 Id. at 508.
684 451 F. Supp. 2d 1318 (S.D. Fla. 2006).
-5 Id. at 1320-21.
686 Id.




691 Id. at 1320.
62 Id. at 1322 (internal quotation and citation ommitted).
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courts."' Accordingly, Brazil was an available alternative
forum.694
The court then turned to application of the public and pri-
vate interest factors.695 The court began its analysis by noting
that although the presumption in favor of plaintiffs choice of
forum is ordinarily strong, the presumption has less force for
foreign plaintiffs.6 96 Therefore, the court did not give deference
to plaintiffs' choice of forum.6
9 7
Next, the court considered the private interest factors and de-
termined that the parties would have greater access to proof in
Brazil, as that was where the accident occurred and where all the
eyewitnesses and relevant documents were located.69 Perhaps
most importantly, the court's subpoena power could not be
used to compel the third party witnesses to testify or produce
documents in the United States.699 In Brazil, however, the court
would have the power to compel witnesses to attend and the
production of documents. 700 The court also explained that de-
fendants could not join the operator of the helicopter in the
United States action because a United States court could not
exercise personal jurisdiction over the company.70 1 On the
other hand, the operator could be easily joined in Brazil. 7 2 Fi-
nally, the court noted that plaintiffs and many of the third-party
witnesses spoke Portuguese and would "be able to more fully
participate... in proceedings that are conducted in their native
language. 70 ' Accordingly, the court found that the private in-
terest factors heavily favored dismissal.70 4
The court then considered the public interest factors.70 5 The
court agreed with the defendants that it did not make sense to
utilize the resources of a busy United States court to try the




696 Id. at 1322-23.
697 Id. at 1323.







705 Id. at 1325.
706 Id.
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timony, coupled with the necessity of employing translators for
testimony and documents, would be inefficient, time consuming
and costly. 70 7 Additionally, it would be an unfair burden to com-
pel jurors to sit on these trials to resolve cases with no connec-
tion to the community. 708 The court further found that Brazil
had a much stronger local interest in resolving these cases and
concluded that the relevant public interest factors also weighed
in favor of dismissal.70 9
B. SIDDI V. OzARK AIRCRAFT SYSTEMS, LLC 710
Plaintiffs' claims arose when Flash Airlines (Flash) Flight 604
crashed into the Red Sea off the coast of Egypt.711 The flight
was en route from Egypt to Paris, France. 712 All those aboard the
aircraft were killed.7 13 The aircraft had been manufactured by
Boeing Company and was sold and delivered to International
Lease Finance Corporation (ILFC) .714 The aircraft was repaired
by Ozark Aircraft Systems (Ozark), which maintained an aircraft
repair station authorized by the FAA.715 ILFC leased the aircraft
to Flash, an Egyptian air carrier.7 16 Plaintiffs alleged that in Feb
ruary 2003, Flash informed ILFC that the aircraft's rudder
power control unit and autopilot had a defect. 717 Plaintiffs
claim that ILFC and Ozark represented to Flash that the alleged
defect did not pose a safety hazard. 18 Plaintiffs sued defendants
ILFC and David Fulford, an ILFC employee ("defendants"), as
well as other parties, in the Western District of Arkansas, alleg-
ing negligence and product liability theories. 719 Defendants
moved to sever and dismiss the claims against them based on the
doctrine of forum non conveniens.720
As a preliminary matter, the court addressed whether the
claims against defendants could be severed from the action
707 Id.
708 Id.
709 Id. at 1325-26.
710 No. 05-5170, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84882 (W.D. Ark. Nov. 21, 2006).
711 Id. at *2.
712 Id.
713 Id. at *4.
714 Id. at *3.
715 Id.
716 Id. at *4.
717 Id.
718 Id.
719 Id. at *8-9.
720 Id. at *2.
274
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
under Rule 21 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.72 ' The
court concluded that, at most, these defendants were joint
torffeasors. 722 Accordingly, the severance of these claims would
not impair plaintiffs' ability to obtain complete relief or cause
any party to incur inconsistent obligations. 72 Thus severance
was proper.12
The court then considered dismissal pursuant to the forum
non conveniens doctrine. 25 The court considered the private in-
terest factors and found that they weighed in favor of dismis-
sal.72 6 Defendants were willing to submit to the jurisdiction of a
French court and to waive any statute of limitations defense.7 2 7
Thus, there was an adequate alternative forum. Further, plain-
tiffs, beneficiaries, and decedents, were all from France in this
case.7 21 Information regarding plaintiffs' damages was, in large
part, located in France.729 The critical witnesses and documents
concerning Flash's operations and the subject aircraft were in
Egypt.730 Further, some of the witnesses were beyond the sub-
poena power of the United States courts, but "could be secured
through a French court. '731 Similarly, documents and other evi-
dence in Flash's possession would be more readily available to a
French court.7 3 2 All of the United States documents and wit-
nesses were within the control of defendants and would there-
fore be accessible to a French court.733 Further, given that
litigation arising from this accident was already pending in the
French courts, "dismissal [was] warranted to avoid the possibility
of inefficient and duplicative proceedings. 7 4
The court then turned to the public interest factors and deter-
mined that these factors also warranted dismissal.735 The court
found that France had a great interest in the controversy's out-
721 Id. at *13.
722 Id. at *14.
723 Id.
724 Id.
725 Id. at *15.
726 Id. at *20-21.
727 Id. at *18.






734 Id. at *20.
735 Id. at *21.
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come, while the United States' interest was minimal.736 Because
both the public and private interest factors weighed in favor of
dismissal, defendants' motion was granted. 37
C. VAN SCHIJNDEL V. BOEING CO.
7 3 8
Plaintiffs, Dutch citizens, sued defendants, Boeing Company
and Goodrich Corporation ("Defendants"), in the United States
District Court for the Central District of California, for claims
arising from the crash of Singapore Airlines (SIA) Flight SQ006
at Chiang Kai-Shek International Airport in Taipei, Taiwan.739
A collision occurred between the airplane and construction
equipment when the airplane attempted to take off from a
closed runway that was undergoing repairs.740 Plaintiffs' com-
plaint asserted products liability claims against defendants.74 '
Initially, the court dismissed plaintiffs' claims on the grounds
of forum non conveniens, finding that an adequate alternative fo-
rum for the case existed, among other places, in the country of
Singapore and that dismissal was preferable in light of the pri-
vate and public interest. 42 Subsequently, the court's ruling was
reversed and remanded by the Ninth Circuit.743 The Ninth Cir-
cuit pointed out that the lower court identified three fora that
were possibly more convenient for the litigation of the case,
when it should have resolved "whether any single forum would
have been a more convenient forum than the district court in
Los Angeles." '744 Defendants renewed their motion to dismiss in
conformance with the Ninth Circuit's ruling and claimed that
"the balancing of private and public interest factors favor[ed]
litigation in Singapore." '45
The court concluded that dismissal on the grounds of forum
non conveniens was appropriate. 746 First, the court found that
Singapore was an adequate alternative forum, as defendants
were amenable to service of process in that forum.747 Defend-
736 Id.
737 Id. at *22.
738 434 F. Supp. 2d 766 (C.D. Cal. 2006).
739 Id. at 768-69.






746 Id. at 769.
747 Id. at 775.
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ants had agreed to submit to the jurisdiction of the Singapore
courts and to waive any statute of limitations defense that might
apply to the re-filed claims for sixty days. 74 8 Defendants also
agreed to make available in the Singapore action "any evidence
or witnesses in their possession, custody or control. '7"9 Finally,
defendants agreed to pay any final judgment a Singapore court
might award against them.750 The court noted that when a de-
fendant voluntarily submits to the jurisdiction of a foreign fo-
rum, it is not necessary to analyze the details of the foreign
forum's laws. 7 5 ' However, defendants were also able to show
that plaintiffs would have an adequate remedy in Singapore.75 2
The court then considered the private interest factors and
found that the factors weighed in favor of dismissal.753 First, evi-
dence would be the most accessible to a Singapore court be-
cause Singapore was the center of the litigation arising from the
flight. 754 Additionally, the Singapore court could gain access to
evidence which the American court could not control, including
the testimony of the three flight crew members who are re-
sidents of Singapore, SIA witnesses and records concerning the
flight crew's training and qualifications, SIA training and opera-
tions manuals and personnel, evidence produced during the
Singaporean investigation of the accident, and, most impor-
tantly, the aircraft's maintenance records.755
The court also found that the other private interest factors
weighed in favor of dismissal. 756 Although plaintiffs were re-
sidents of the Netherlands and the defendants were citizens of
the United States, the fact that numerous relevant witnesses re-
sided in Singapore counted strongly in favor of allowing the ac-
tion to proceed in Singapore.757 These Singaporean witnesses
could not be reached by compulsory process in the United
States, but could be reached by compulsory process in Singa-
pore.758 Further, defendants were willing to transport to Singa-
pore all evidence within their possession, custody, and
748 Id.
749 Id. at 774.
750 Id.
751 Id. at 775.
752 Id.
753 Id. at 775, 778.
754 Id. at 776.
755 Id. at 776-77.
756 Id. at 778-81.
757 Id. at 778.
758 Id. at 779.
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control. 75" Finally, allowing plaintiffs to sue these defendants in
the United States while concurrent proceedings were pending
in Singapore presented a risk of prejudice.76 °
The court also found that the public interest factors weighed
in favor of dismissal.761 The court determined that court con-
gestion was not an issue in Singapore, while the Central District
of California was "one of the busiest districts in the [United
States] .,762 Allowing the case to proceed in this court would im-
pair the opportunity for local litigants to try their cases.7 63 Fur-
ther, California had a minimal interest in the case, while
Singapore had a significant interest in the litigation.764
Because the public and private interest factors weighed in
favor of dismissal, and because Singapore was an adequate alter-
native forum, the court dismissed the case.7 65
XIV. CHOICE OF LAW
A. IN RE AIR CRASH AT BELLE HARBOR, NEW YoRK ON
NOVEMBER 12, 2001766
This litigation resulted from the crash of an Airbus A-300 air-
craft, operated as American Airlines (American) Flight 587, at
Belle Harbor, New York.767 Everyone on board the aircraft died,
five Belle Harbor residents were killed, and other residents suf-
fered injuries and sustained damage to their property. 768 A Na-
tional Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) investigation found
that the "aircraft's vertical stabilizer and rudder separated in
flight and fell into the water" over Jamaica Bay.76 9 No longer
capable of flight, the aircraft crashed into the residential neigh-
borhood of Belle Harbor. 770 Defendants petitioned the court
for a determination that (1) New York law should govern the
passenger, crew, and ground cases; (2) the Warsaw Convention
applied to all passenger claims against American Airlines; and
759 Id.
760 Id. at 780.
761 Id. at 785.
762 Id. at 782.
763 Id.
764 Id.
765 Id. at 785.
766 No. 1448 (RWS), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387 (S.D.N.Y. May 9, 2006).
767 Id. at *1.
768 Id. at *1-2.




(3) French law applied to claims against Airbus for punitive
damages.7
The court addressed the threshold question of whether admi-
ralty jurisdiction could be exercised over the claims that arose
from the deaths of the Flight 587 passengers.772 The court ar-
ticulated the test for admiralty jurisdiction: (1) the alleged
wrong must have occurred over navigable waters; and (2) there
must be a sufficient nexus between the incident and a maritime
activity.773 The sufficient nexus test involves two distinct inquir-
ies.7 7 ' First, the incident must have a "potentially disruptive im-
pact on maritime commerce; ' 775 and second, the incident must
bear a significant relationship to traditional maritime activity.776
The court noted that the "potential effects" test does not look to
the "particular facts of the incident," but to the incident's gen-
eral features. 777 The inquiry is "whether the incident [can] be
seen within a class of incidents that pose [ ] more than a fanciful
risk to commercial shipping. v77
The court found that both prongs of the nexus test were satis-
fied.7 79 The court noted that the federal courts are almost unan-
imous in finding a "significant relationship to maritime activity"
when the transoceanic or island voyage would have been con-
ducted by sea, but for air travel.78 ° In this case, as the aircraft
was scheduled to make a 1500 mile transoceanic flight, it is un-
questionable that it bore a "significant relationship to traditional
maritime activity. '78  The court also found that a determination
of "potential impact on maritime commerce" was supported by
the accident's general features. 782
Additionally, the court found that the location test was satis-
fied.783 It is undisputed that losing the vertical stabilizer and
rudder over Jamaica Bay rendered the aircraft incapable of
771 Id. at *2.
772 Id. at *21.
773 Id. at *23-26.
774 Id. at *26.
775 Id.
776 Id.
777 Id. at *30.
778 Id. at *31 (citing Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great Lakes Dredge & Dock
Co., 513 U.S. 527, 539 (1995)).
779 Id. at *32.
780 Id. at *26-27.
781 Id. at *28.
782 Id. at *31.
783 Id. at *36.
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flight and made the deaths of all on board inevitable. 8 Thus,
the accident occurred over the navigable waters of Jamaica
Bay. v8 5 As both the location and the nexus tests were met, the
passenger claims fell within the federal courts' admiralty
jurisdiction.7" 6
The next inquiry for the court was whether admiralty jurisdic-
tion displaced state law with regard to compensatory damages
for wrongful death.787 The court noted at the outset that exer-
cising admiralty jurisdiction "does not result in automatic dis-
placement of state law;" however, state legislation does not apply
when "it contravenes the essential purpose expressed by an act
of Congress, or works material prejudice to the characteristic
features of the general maritime law, or interferes with the
proper harmony and uniformity of that law in its international
and interstate relations."7 8 The court noted the absence of an
admiralty statute for the "wrongful death of non-seafarers in ter-
ritorial waters."'7 89 Thus, the general maritime death action rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,
Inc.79° governed here.9 Such an action encompassed claims for
negligence, unseaworthiness, and strict products liability. 79 2 It
also recognized a survival action for an estate.793
However, it remained in question whether the Moragne cause
of action preempted the state wrongful death and survival stat-
utes.794 The court noted that the Supreme Court addressed this
question in Yamaha Motor Corp. v. Calhounv9 5 and concluded that
Moragne did not preclude the "concurrent application of state
wrongful death statutes. ' 7 6 The court followed the majority of
federal courts and held that Moragne created a floor for recov-
ery, not a ceiling. 79 7 While courts may augment the Moragne
784 Id.
785 Id.
786 Id. at *36-39.
787 Id. at *39.
788 Id. at *40 (citing S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917)).
789 Id. at *44.
790 398 U.S. 375, 390 (1970).
791 Belle Harbor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387, at *44.
792 Id.
793 Id. at *45.
794 Id. at *45-46.
795 516 U.S. 199 (1996).
796 Belle Harbor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387, at *46.
797 Id. at *47-48.
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remedy with state law that allows for greater damages, they can-
not apply state law that narrows recovery. 798
In order to determine whether state law applied in this case, it
was necessary for the court to determine whether the applicable
state law would result in a more- or less-generous recovery than
the Moragne remedy. 799 The court applied "admiralty choice-of-
law rules to determine which state law [would] supplement the
general maritime death action. '" ' In Lauritzen v. Larsen, 1' a
case involving the wrongful death of a seaman, the Supreme
Court outlined seven factors to be considered in the choice of
law analysis:
(1) the place of the wrongful act;
(2) the law of the flag;
(3) the allegiance or domicile of the injured seaman;
(4) the allegiance of the defendant ship owner;
(5) the place where the contract of employment was made;
(6) the inaccessibility of a foreign forum; and
(7) the law of the forum.8 °2
The court found that here, the domicile of the parties and the
place of injury were the most important factors in determining
compensatory damages. 0 3 As the place of injury for the passen-
ger suits was New York, and only two passengers were not domi-
ciled in New York, the law of New York was the applicable state
law.80 4 Because New York law did not permit recovery of non-
pecuniary damages in wrongful death actions, the available rem-
edy was less generous than that provided by the Moragne mari-
time action. 0 5 Thus, compensatory damages were correctly
measured by the general maritime law.80 6
The court next determined that damages for loss of society
are recoverable in a Moragne action. 807 The court found that the
Supreme Court, in Sea-Land Services, Inc. v. Gaudet,8 °8 permitted
recovery "for funeral expenses and loss of decedent's support,
798 Id. at *47.
799 Id.
80 Id. at *50-51.
801 345 U.S. 571 (1953).
802 Belle Harbor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387, at *51 (quoting Hellenic Lines,
Ltd. v. Rhuditis, 398 U.S. 306, 308 (1970)).
803 Id. at *52.
804 Id. at *52-54.
805 Id. at *54.
806 Id.
807 Id. at *54-55.
808 414 U.S. 573 (1974).
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household services, parental nurture, training, education and
guidance to his children, and loss of society."809
The court also held that punitive damages could be recovered
under general admiralty law.8 l ° There was no applicable admi-
ralty statute barring punitive damages, and the majority of
courts considering the issue have allowed recovery of punitive
damages in death cases governed by general maritime law."'1
Finally, the court considered which forum's law would apply
to punitive damages claims against Airbus.8 12 The court ex-
plained that conflict-of-law issues should be decided under depe-
cage, an issue-specific approach that recognizes that, in an
action, different fora may have varying degrees of interest with
respect to the various facts and elements of a claim or de-
fense."" Since the goals of punitive damages differ from those
of compensatory damages, it was appropriate to apply different
laws to the two types of recovery.8 1 4 The punitive damages in-
quiry should focus on "the defendant's principal place of busi-
ness" and "the place where the misconduct that is the subject of
the punitive damages claim took place. ' 815 Applying this analy-
sis to the passenger claims, the court was unable to make a de-
termination of the appropriate forum, due to the uncertainty as
to the place of the relevant conduct." 6
With regard to the ground claims, the court found that the
law of New York governed punitive damages against Airbus.s" y
The court determined that the claims brought by the ground
plaintiffs were within the federal courts' diversity jurisdiction.818
Therefore, choice of law issues were governed by the forum state
of New York.81 9 New York's choice of law rules require that New
York law be used to determine punitive damages, as that was the
forum with the most significant interest in having its law applied
to the ground plaintiffs' claims.8 2°
809 Belle Harbor, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27387, at *54-55.
810 Id. at *69-70.
811 Id.
812 Id. at *72.
813 Id.
814 Id. at *74.
815 Id. at *75.
816 Id. at *82.
817 Id. at *86.
818 Id. at *85.
819 Id.
820 Id. at *86.
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XV. CLASS ACTION CERTIFICATION
A. IN RE NIGERIA CHARTER FLIGHTS CONTRACT LITIGATION821
Plaintiffs were passengers who purchased plane tickets for
round-trip travel between the United States and Nigeria. 22
Without notice, the defendant-air-carrier cancelled plaintiffs'
flights.8 23 Plaintiffs sought certification of two classes: those who
were stranded in the United States because they could not "use
the return portion of their ticket to Nigeria," and those who
were not transported from Nigeria back to the United States.82 4
The court considered the prerequisites to class certification
set forth in Rule 23(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure.8 25 First, the court considered the numerosity requirement
of Rule 23(a) (1), which requires that the proposed class be "so
numerous thatjoinder of all members is impracticable.8 26 The
court noted that in the Second Circuit, a class of more than
forty people is "presumed to meet the numerosity require-
ment. '8 27 The proposed classes contained an estimated 3,000 to
4,000 people.8 28 Therefore, the court found that the numerosity
requirement was satisfied. 29
The court then turned to the commonality, typicality, and ad-
equacy requirements of Rule 23(a) (2).130 The court found that
the commonality requirement was satisfied, as all plaintiffs based
their claims on identical terms and conditions of their tickets.8 3'
The typicality requirement also was satisfied, as each class mem-
ber made similar arguments regarding the cancellation of their
flights without notice.3 2 Further, plaintiffs had sufficiently
shown that representation was adequate, as plaintiffs' counsel
were "competent to handle the case" and there were "no con-
flicts of interest among class members."' 33
821 233 F.R.D. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
822 Id. at 299.
823 Id.
824 Id.
825 Id. at 301.
826 FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a)(1); Nigeria Charter, 233 F.R.D. at 301-02.
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The court next examined whether class certification was ap-
propriate under Rule 23(b). 3 4 The court found that the only
appropriate grounds for certification was pursuant to Rule
23(b) (3), which permits certification if (1) the court finds "that
the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers," . . . and (2) "a class action is superior to other available
methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the contro-
versy."8 35 The court found that both of these requirements were
satisfied. 3 6 First, plaintiffs' claims did not "rely on individual-
ized representations," and common proof was necessary to es-
tablish their claims.837 Additionally, to the extent that plaintiffs
needed to establish reliance, the representations relied upon
were made to the entire class.8 38 The court rejected defendants'
argument that the individualized damages inquiries in this case
destroyed predominance, finding that if courts considered "the
need for individualized damage determinations," few class ac-
tions could be maintained.8 39 Similarly, the court rejected the
argument that the mere possibility of conflicts among applicable
state laws precluded class certification. 40
The court also concluded that a class action was superior to
other methods of adjudication given "the prohibitive cost [to
plaintiffs] of proceeding individually."84  Further, the signifi-
cant size of the proposed classes and the number of actions that
had been consolidated made class action certification the most
fair and efficient method for adjudication of these actions.8 42
Because all of the requirements of Rule 23 were met, the court
certified a single class of all passengers to whom defendants
failed to provide transportation between Nigeria and the United
States.843
834 Id.
835 FED. R. Crv. P. 23(b)(3); Nigeria Charter, 233 F.R.D. at 304, 306.
836 Nigeria Charter, 233 F.R.D. at 306.
837 Id. at 304.
838 Id. at 305.
839 Id.






B. RICHARDS V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.8 4"
Plaintiff lost a piece of baggage during an international flight
that terminated in Atlanta, Georgia.-4 5 Plaintiff filed a claim
with Delta seeking the fair-market value of her baggage and its
contents.8"" In response, Delta advised plaintiff that because her
'journey involve[d] international travel, liability for loss [of her
baggage] is governed by [the Warsaw Convention]. ''847 Delta
further informed plaintiff that, under article 22(2) of the War-
saw Convention, its liability was capped at $20.00 per kilo-
gram. 48 The letter continued: "Since [Delta's] maximum
allowable weight is thirty-two kilograms per bag, our check for
$640.00, which is the maximum reimbursement, will be
mailed under separate cover.18 41 Plaintiff cashed the check
upon receipt.8 50
Citing Cruz v. American Airlines, Inc.,85 1 plaintiff filed a class-
action suit against Delta.852 The court in Cruz held that a carrier
was only entitled to the Warsaw Convention's "liability limitation
for lost or damaged baggage" when the carrier records the
weight of the luggage on the passenger's baggage ticket.8 53
Plaintiff claimed that Delta failed to record the weight of the
baggage as a matter of practice and was therefore liable for the
full market value of the lost or damaged baggage. 5' The puta-
tive class consisted of approximately three thousand people who
received less than the fair market value for their lost or damaged
baggage between December 17, 1997, and March 3, 1999.55
The complaint sought a declaratory judgment stating that Delta
was liable for the market value of the class members' baggage
because it unlawfully availed itself of the Warsaw Convention's
liability limitations.8 56 The complaint also requested damages
on behalf of each class member equaling the difference between
844 453 F.3d 525 (D.C. Cir. 2006).






851 193 F.3d 526 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
852 Richards, 453 F.3d at 526.
853 Id. at 530.
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the amount Delta paid and the fair market value of the lost or
damaged luggage.857
Following cross-motions for summary judgment, which were
denied based on the existence of triable issues of fact as to
Delta's accord and satisfaction defense, plaintiff moved for class
certification pursuant to Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.8 58 Three years after the commencement of the
action, a motion "to enlarge the previous class certification mo-
tion" to include a request for Rule 23(b) (3) class certification
was filed.859 The district court denied class certification, finding
that although the class satisfied the Rule 23(a) requirements of
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy of represen-
tation, it did not satisfy either Rule 23(b) (2) or (b) (3).86o
With respect to Rule 23(b) (2), the district court cited In re
Veneman,86" ' which held that certification under the Rule "is not
appropriate where plaintiffs claims are predominately for mon-
etary relief."'86 2 Concerning Rule 23(b) (3), the district court ex-
plained that "the plaintiff must show that 'questions of law or
fact common to the members of the class predominate ... and
that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.' "863 The dis-
trict court held that the class did not satisfy this standard be-
cause "Delta's accord and satisfaction affirmative defense ... will
require the application of varying state laws and a case-by-case
factual inquiry." '864 A motion for reconsideration was filed and
the district court denied the motion. 865
857 Id.
858 Id. Under Rule 23(b) (2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a class
action may be maintained if the prerequisites of Rule 23(a) (numerosity, com-
monality, typicality, and adequacy of representation) are satisfied and "the party
opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally applicable to
the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or corresponding de-
claratory relief with respect to the class as a whole." FED. R. Cix. P. 23(b) (2).
859 Richards, 453 F.3d at 527-28. Under Rule 23(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of
Procedure, in addition to satisfying the prerequisites of Rule 23(a), the court
must find "that the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adju-
dication of the controversy." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
86 Richards, 453 F.3d at 528.
861 309 F.3d 789 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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On appeal to the District of Columbia Circuit, the court ini-
tially determined that it had jurisdiction to consider the appeal
of the district court's refusal to certify the class. 66 The court
then moved on to the merits of the appeal.8 67
The circuit court affirmed the district court's decision deny-
ing class certification.868 The circuit court agreed that Rule
23(b) (2) certification was not available because this section was
not intended to extend to cases seeking predominately mone-
tary damages, and the complaint clearly sought monetary dam-
ages on behalf of each class member. 69 The circuit court
likewise agreed that Rule 23(b) (3) certification was inappropri-
ate, not only because it was untimely, but because the arguments
in favor of class certification under this Rule were inconsistent
and failed to establish that a class action was the best way to
resolve the controversy. 70
XVI. INSURANCE COVERAGE
A. POLICY EXCLUSIONS
1. AIG Aviation, Inc. v. Holt Helicopters, Inc.171
In this case, plaintiff Holt Helicopters, sued to recover for
damage to a Robinson R-22 helicopter that crashed in New Mex-
ico on October 20, 2001, while herding cattle. 72 The helicopter
was insured under a policy issued by National Union Fire Insur-
ance Company and managed by AIG Aviation, Inc. 7 3
The declarations page of the policy provided a "Pilot War-
ranty Completion" amendment that provided coverage if the he-
licopter was being operated by certain named pilots.8 7 4 The
amendment also provided coverage if the helicopter was being
piloted by "any commercial pilot with rotary wing ratings prop-
erly certified by the FAA" and with a minimum of 1000 logged
hours in rotary wing aircraft, including 100 hours in a Robinson
R-22.175 Additionally, the policy contained an exclusion stating
that the policy did not provide coverage to the insured if the
866 Id. at 529.
867 Id.
868 Id. at 532.
869 Id. at 530.
870 Id. at 531-32.
871 198 S.W.3d 276 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2006, pet. denied).
872 Id. at 278.
873 Id.
874 Id.
875 Id. at 279.
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helicopter was being piloted by a pilot other than those speci-
fied in the declarations. 76
The pilot operating the helicopter at the time of the accident
was not named in the policy and had only logged 685 logged
flying hours, well short of the 1000 requirement.87 7 Accord-
ingly, AIG declined coverage under the applicable exclusion.878
Plaintiff commenced an action in Texas state court alleging
"breach of contract, wrongful denial of its claim, and violations
of the [Texas] Insurance Code.8179 The parties filed cross-mo-
tions for summary judgment on the issue of whether AIG could
decline coverage "without establishing a causal connection be-
tween the crash and [the pilot's] lack of experience." 0 The
trial court granted plaintiff partial summary judgment, ruling
that plaintiff was entitled to coverage unless AIG proved at trial
that the pilot's lack of experience caused or contributed to the
accident. 81 At trial, the jury found, among other things, that
AIG did not establish a causal connection between the accident
and the pilot's experience. 82 The trial court entered judgment
in favor of plaintiff.8 8 3
On appeal, AIG argued that the trial court erred in ruling
that AIG was required to establish causation between the acci-
dent and the pilot's lack of experience.8 4 AIG asked the appel-
late court to break from the Texas Supreme Court's decision in
Puckett v. U.S. Fire Insurance Co.,885 which held that an insurer
cannot avoid liability unless the alleged breach of the policy is
causally connected to the accident.8 6 AIG argued that the deci-
sion in Puckett was not in keeping with the majority of jurisdic-
tions on this issue and that the decision in Puckett was contrary
to general rules of contract that require a court to give full effect
to the plain meaning of the contract.8 7 The court, however,
noted that the Texas Supreme Court in Puckett gave considera-
876 Id.
877 Id.
878 Id. at 278.
879 Id.





885 678 S.W.2d 936 (Tex. 1984),
-86 Holt, 198 S.W.3d at 279-80.
887 Id. at 280.
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tion to, and rejected, the same arguments."' 8 Puckett was still
good law and thus the court was bound to follow it."' AIG's
remaining arguments were rejected and the trial court's judg-
ment was affirmed. 890
2. Griffin v. Old Republic Insurance Co. 9'
Robert Griffin was seriously injured when an airplane insured
by Old Republic Insurance Company (Old Republic) crashed in
his backyard.892 The policy excluded coverage when "the Air-
worthiness Certificate of the aircraft is not in full force and ef-
fect" or when "the aircraft has not been subjected to the
appropriate airworthiness inspection(s) as required under cur-
rent applicable Federal Air Regulations for the operations in-
volved. '8 9 3 The aircraft did not have a current airworthiness
certificate at the time of the crash.8 9 4
Griffin filed an action in Nevada state court against the pilot
of the aircraft and his wife. 95 Old Republic then filed an action
in the United States District Court, District of Nevada, seeking a
declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to pay damages
to Griffin or the pilot because the policy did not cover an air-
plane without a current airworthiness certificate.89 6 The district
court granted summary judgment to Old Republic, holding that
under Nevada law, there need not be a causal connection be-
tween the accident and the exclusion for an insurer to avoid
liability.8 97
Griffin appealed to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, which
certified the following question of law to the Nevada Supreme
Court:
Under Nevada law, may an insurer deny coverage under an avia-
tion insurance policy for failure to comply with an unambiguous
requirement of the policy or is a causal connection between the
insured's noncompliance and the accident required?898
888 Id.
889 Id.
890 Id. at 288.
891 133 P.3d 251 (Nev. 2006).
892 Id. at 252-53.
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The Nevada Supreme Court answered the question in the af-
firmative, holding that:
"insurers need not establish a causal connection between a safety-
related aviation policy exclusion and the loss in order to exclude
coverage so long as the exclusion is unambiguous, narrowly tai-
lored, and essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer."899
B. SEPTEMBER 11, 2001 COVERAGE DISPUTES
1. PMA Capital Insurance Co. v. US Airways, Inc.9 °°
Following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the
World Trade Center in New York, the FAA issued a Notice to
Airmen (NOTAM) that ordered "all civilian aircraft to land or
stay on the ground."9 ' Shortly thereafter, the attack on the
Pentagon occurred, and Ronald Reagan Washington National
Airport (Reagan National Airport) was evacuated and closed.9 °2
Although other airports throughout the country were allowed to
reopen several days after the attacks, a Temporary Flight Restric-
tion issued by the FAA closed the air space within twenty-five
nautical miles of Reagan National Airport.90 3 As a result, the
airport remained closed for approximately two weeks, and US
Airways could not conduct commercial flights from the airport
until October 4, 2001.904
US Airways filed a claim under a policy issued by PMA Capital
Insurance Company (PMA) for business interruption losses. 905
PMA, in turn, declined coverage. 906 US Airways then filed an
action in Virginia state court and was granted judgment in its
favor.90 7 On appeal to the Virginia Supreme Court, the issue
was whether "[i]t was error for the trial court to find that any
payments received by US Airways from [the] federal [govern-
ment] pursuant to the [Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act (ATSSSA)] were not recoveries under the [pol-
icy's] set-off provision."908
899 Id. at 256-57.
9oo 626 S.E.2d 369 (Va. 2006).






907 Id. at 371-72.
908 Id. at 372.
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The policy provided that "all salvages, recoveries, and pay-
ments, excluding proceeds from subrogation and underlying in-
surance recovered or received prior to a loss settlement under
this policy shall reduce the loss accordingly. 9 '0 US Airways con-
tended that the ATSSSA was never intended to reduce insurance
proceedsY' ° PMA countered that the plain language of the pol-
icy required a reduction for these payments.9 1'
The court held that the amounts received from the federal
government under the ATSSSA constituted a "payment" or "re-
covery" under the policy, requiring a reduction in US Airways'
claim.9 2 The court stated that in ruling that US Airways was not
required to reduce its claims for the amounts recovered from
the government, "the trial court essentially re-wrote the Policy
and made a new contract between PMA and US Airways."' 3 As
US Airways received $310 million from the federal government
under the ATSSSA, an amount that was in excess of the policy
limits, judgment was entered in favor of PMA.9 4
2. United Air Lines, Inc. v. Insurance Co. of Pennsylvania -'
In this case, United Air Lines, Inc. ("United") sought cover-
age for the lost earnings it sustained as a result of the September
11, 2001, terrorist attacks."16 United commenced an action in
the United States District Court, Southern District of New York,
seeking a declaratory judgment and damages for breach of con-
tract under a $25 million "Property Terrorism & Sabotage" in-
surance policy issued by the Insurance Company of the State of
Pennsylvania (ISOP) ."
United's ticket office in the World Trade Center was de-
stroyed and ISOP conceded that United was entitled to recover
under the policy for lost earnings resulting from the physical
damage.9 8 United's facilities at Ronald Reagan Washington Na-
tional Airport ("Reagan National Airport"), however, were not
damaged as a result of the attacks.9 9
909 Id. at 371 (internal punctuation ommitted).
910 Id.
91, Id. at 372.
912 Id. at 374.
913 Id.
914 Id.
915 439 F.3d 128 (2d Cir. 2006).
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Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the district
court granted summary judgment in favor of ISOP, holding that
the terms of the policy did not provide coverage for alleged lost
earnings that were not directly related to the damage sustained
to United's offices at the World Trade Center.92 ° On appeal to
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, the issue was whether
United could recover "for its lost earnings caused by the . . .
disruption of flight service" and the temporary closing of Rea-
gan National Airport, despite the fact that no physical damage
was sustained to United's facilities at Reagan National Airport. 92'
The Second Circuit found that the policy covered losses for
business interruption "caused by damage to or destruction of
the Insured Locations. '9 22 Losses relating to damage to the
World Trade Center location were therefore recoverable. 923
However, the court held that those losses that were attributable
solely to the government suspension of air service, and not
"damage to or destruction of' a United location, were not com-
pensable under the policy.9
24
Nor did the Second Circuit find that the policy's "civil author-
ity" clause provided coverage for these losses.925 Under this
clause, United would have been entitled to coverage if it had
been blocked by the government from accessing its property as
"a direct result of damage to adjacent premises. "926 United ar-
gued that the Pentagon, which is located approximately one
mile from United's facilities at Reagan National Airport, was an
"adjacent premises. ' 927 The court questioned the logic of this
argument and noted that, even if it was an "adjacent premises,"
the claimed lost earnings were not a "direct result" of the dam-
age to the Pentagon.9 28 Rather, the losses stemmed from gov-
ernment efforts to avoid a future attack by closing Reagan
National Airport, which resulted in the suspension of United's
services from that airport.929 Accordingly, the court held that
920 Id. at 130.
921 Id. at 128.









there was no coverage for these losses.9 "" The judgment of the
district court was affirmed.93 '
3. In re September 11th Liability Insurance Coverage Cases' 32
In accordance with the Air Transportation Safety and System
Stabilization Act (ATSSSA), those injured in and around the
World Trade Center site and their legal successors were given
the option of pursuing compensation from the specially created
Victim Compensation Fund, or filing suit in the Southern Dis-
trict of New York.933 These cases, alleging claims against the
Port Authority and its lessees, were consolidated before District
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein of the Southern District." 4
In June 2006,Judge Hellerstein decided a summary judgment
motion filed by the primary and excess insurers who covered the
lessees of Towers One and Two of the World Trade Center.935
The motions sought declarations that the respective liability in-
surance policies did not extend coverage for defense costs.93 6
With the exception of one insurer, the motions were granted
and it was declared that the operative instruments did not in-
clude a duty to defend.937 In fact, the court held that the opera-
tive instruments "explicitly excluded defense costs" when the
terrorist attacks occurred on September 11, 2001.938
In so ruling, the court determined that regulation 107 of the
New York Insurance Law does not, in this case, impose a duty to
provide defense costs since the equities do not favor the court
rewriting the clear language of the parties' bargained-for agree-
ment.939 However, the operative instrument with one excess in-
surer, Royal Insurance Company, did undertake the duty to
930 Id. at 135.
931 Id.
932 458 F. Supp. 2d 104 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
933 Id. at 110.
934 Id.
- 5 Id. at 108.
936 Id. at 130-31.
937 Id. at 116. Since some insurance agreements, most significantly the primary
and umbrella coverage, were in binder form on September 11, 2001, Judge Hel-
lerstein held that these instruments were the legally operative agreements, rather
than the final policies issued later. See id. at 115.
938 Id. at 108.
939Id. at 118-19. Judge Hellerstein also suggests that one or more of the "vari-
ous exceptions" to Regulation 107 noted in earlier decisions applies, but there is
no explicit discussion of which of those exceptions now applies. See id. at 119.
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"defend beyond any exhausted limits of the underlying
policies." 4 '
XVII. ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
A. IsLA NENA AIR SERvCES, INC. V. CESSNA AIcRAFT Co. 941
On August 30, 2003, plaintiffs plane, a Cessna 208B, was dam-
aged when it was forced to make an emergency landing.942
Plaintiff, "a short-haul commercial airline" in Puerto Rico, com-
menced an action against Cessna Aircraft Co. (Cessna), the air-
craft manufacturer, and Pratt & Whitney Canada Corp. (PWC),
the engine manufacturer, to recover for the damage sustained
to the aircraft and its components, including the destruction of
the engine.943 It was not disputed that a defect in the aircraft
caused the forced landing and the damage to the aircraft.9 44
The defendants moved to dismiss plaintiffs claims.945 Plain-
tiff premised its claims on strict liability and negligence theories,
seeking to recover economic losses from the loss of the aircraft,
repair to the aircraft, loss of business income, and lost profits.9 4 6
Defendants claimed that plaintiffs claims were barred by the ec-
onomic loss rule under both admiralty and Puerto Rico law.9 4 v
In essence, the economic loss rule provides that a party cannot
recover in tort when a defective product harms only the product
itself, instead of a person or other property.948 Rather, the party
seeking recovery is limited to the remedies available under the
applicable warranty or sales contract.949 .Since plaintiff did not
allege any claims for personal injury or damage to other prop-
erty, the case turned on whether the economic loss rule would
apply.950
The district court ruled that the economic loss rule applied to
both of plaintiffs theories of recovery, thus requiring dismis-
sal.9 5' The court applied the two-part test from Executive Jet Avia-
940 Id. at 126.
94' 449 F.3d 85 (1st Cir. 2006).
942 Id. at 86.
943 Id.
944 Id. at 88.
945 Id.
946 Id. at 86.
947 Id. at 87.
948 Id.
949 Id. at 88-89.
950 Id. at 86-87.
951 Id. at 87.
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tion, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, OhioY5 2 and held that both prongs of
the test were satisfied, which triggered the application of the ec-
onomic loss rule.953 In the alternative, the court held that Pu-
erto Rico law would also apply the economic loss rule, even
though the Puerto Rico Supreme Court had yet to address the
issue. Thus, plaintiffs strict liability and negligence claims
were dismissed. 5
On appeal, the First Circuit Court of Appeals decided not to
rule upon the issue of whether admiralty law applied to the
case. 956 After consulting Puerto Rico law, the court held that
the Puerto Rico Supreme Court would apply the economic loss
rule in this case.9 57 The court stated that an action predicated
on article 1802 of Puerto Rico's Civil Code, which provides that
a "person who by an act or omission causes damage to another
party through fault or negligence shall be obligated to repair
the damage so done," is barred by the economic loss rule where
the defective product only harms itself.95 Thus, the lower
court's decision was affirmed, albeit on slightly different
grounds, and plaintiffs claims seeking recovery of economic
losses from the crash were properly dismissed.959
XVIII. COMMON LAW NEGLIGENCE
A. GORFINKLE V. U.S. AIRWAYS, INC.9 60
Plaintiff was allegedly injured while trying to retrieve his lug-
gage from a U.S. Airways baggage claim area.961 The luggage
was stacked two or three bags high in a roped off area.9 62 Plain-
tiff entered the roped off area, climbed onto the stacked lug-
gage, and walked on the stacks looking for his baggage.9 63 He
952 409 U.S. 249, 268 (1972); see Isla Nena Air Servs., Inc. v. Cessna Aircraft Co.,
380 F. Supp. 2d 74, 77 (D.P.R. 2005) ("first, the situs of the crash had to be within
navigable waters; and second, there had to be some nexus between the type of
activity involved and traditional maritime activity.") (emphasis in original).
953 Isla Nena Air Servs., 449 F.3d at 87.
954 Id.
955 Id.
956 Id. at 88.
957 Id.
958 Id. (internal citation ommitted).
959 Id. at 91, 93.
960 431 F.3d. 19 (1st Cir. 2005).
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tried to pull a suitcase out from under two other bags, lost his
balance and fell, injuring himself.964
Plaintiff, a Massachusetts resident, filed a negligence claim
against U.S. Airways.965 The court concluded that summary
judgment was appropriate because walking on top of stacked
luggage was an open and obvious danger, such that U.S. Airways
owed no duty of care to plaintiff.966 The court noted that under
Massachusetts law, a property owner does not have a duty to pro-
tect or warn a visitor from dangers that are "obvious to persons
of average intelligence."967 The court held that walking across
stacked luggage is an open and obvious danger.96 Here, an or-
dinarily intelligent plaintiff would have recognized the risk of
falling if he tried to walk on top of stacked luggage.969 Accord-
ingly, U.S. Airways owed no duty to plaintiff.97 °
B. EARLEY v. UNITED AIRLINEs 7
Plaintiff filed this negligence claim against United Airlines
(United) alleging that as she was getting into her seat, the tray
table in front of the unoccupied seat next to her suddenly fell
and struck her.972 Plaintiff alleged that she lost her balance and
fell. 973 She did not report the incident while on the plane, de-
spite feeling pain in her knee.974 She asserted that the tray table
randomly fell open several more times throughout the flight,
but she did not report the problem.9 75
Plaintiff's negligence claims were grounded in negligence per
se, res ipsa loquitur, and general negligence.976 Under her negli-
gence per se theory, plaintiff claimed that United violated federal
regulations that require "an airline to stow food, beverage and
tray tables during taxiing, take-off and landing." '977 The court
964 Id.
965 Id.
966 Id. at 23.
967 Id. at 24.
968 Id.
969 Id.
970 Id. at 24-25.
971 No. 2:05-cv-0835, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 70439 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2006).
972 Id. at *1-2.
973 Id. at *2.
974 Id.
975 Id.
976 Id. at *7.
977 Id.
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rejected this theory for several reasons.9"8 First, under applica-
ble Ohio law, violating an administrative rule is not negligence
per se, only potential evidence of negligence. 79 Second, the fed-
eral regulations concern stowing tray tables specifically "while
[the plane] is taxiing, taking off, and landing.'"981 Here, the in-
cident occurred nearly one hour into the flight. 81 Thus, it was
unclear whether there was any violation of the regulations and
there was no genuine issue of material fact enabling plaintiff to
prove negligence per se.982
The court then turned to plaintiffs res ipsa loquitur theory,
noting that for plaintiff to succeed under the doctrine, she must
prove that:
(1) the instrumentality causing the injury was, at the time of
the injury, or at the time of the creation of the condition causing
the injury, under the exclusive management and control of the
defendant; and
(2) the injury occurred under such circumstances that in the
ordinary course of events it would not have occurred if ordinary
care had been observed.983
In this case, the evidence did not sufficiently support an infer-
ence that United had exclusive control of the tray table at all
times prior to it falling on plaintiff.984 The evidence did not
eliminate "the possibility that someone other than United also
exercised control of the tray table" prior to the accident. 98 5 As a
matter of law, this possibility negated any inference that United
retained exclusive control of the tray table and defeated plain-
tiff's res ipsa loquitur claim.98 6
Finally, the court considered plaintiffs ordinary negligence
claim.987 The court concluded that it was undisputed that
United, as a common carrier, owed plaintiff the "highest degree
of care consistent with practical operations of the carrier. "988
However, there were no genuine issues of material fact as to
978 Id. at *10.
979 Id.
980 Id. at *11.
981 Id.
982 Id.
983 Id. at *12-13.
984 Id. at *17.
985 Id.
986 Id.
987 Id. at *17-18.
988 Id. at *19.
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whether that duty was breached.8 9 It was impractical for United
to inspect each tray table's working condition at all times during
a flight.990 There was neither evidence that United had notice
of a faulty tray table nor was there evidence that the tray table
had a defect."9 ' Without knowledge of a defect, a jury did not
have a basis for concluding that United was negligent.9 9 2
XIX. TRAVEL AGENTS AND ONLINE TICKET SELLERS
A. WORLDSPAN, L.P. v. ORBITz, LLC19 3
This case was premised upon the alleged misconduct of de-
fendant Orbitz, LLC (Orbitz), an online travel agency, in acces-
sing data gathered and maintained by plaintiff Worldspan, LP
(Worldspan)." 4 Plaintiff sued in the Northern District of Illi-
nois, alleging violations of the Consumer Fraud and Abuse Act
(CFAA) and breach of contract.9 9 5 Upon defendant's motion to
dismiss, the court considered whether plaintiff had sufficiently
stated a claim under the CFAA. 9 6
The complaint alleged that defendant violated section
1030(a) (5) (A) (iii) of the CFAA by intentionally accessing "a
protected computer 'without authorization' and thereby causing
damage." '997 Though the complaint alleged Orbitz accessed
plaintiffs data, the agreements between Orbitz and Worldspan
attached to the complaint indicated that Orbitz was given access
to the data.998 An amended agreement, however, limited the
nature of Orbitz's access to the information. 999
The court held that the nature of plaintiff's complaint was not
that defendant accessed plaintiff's data without authorization,
but rather that defendant exceeded its authorization under the
amended agreement 00 Thus, the facts as presented in the
pleadings did not state a claim under the CFAA.'0 1 Plaintiff ar-
989 Id.
990 Id.
991 Id. at *21.
992 Id. at *22.
993 No. 05 C 5386, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 26153 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 19, 2006).
994 Id. at *8.
995 Id. at *9.
996 Id. at *9-10.
997 Id. at *10.
998 Id. at *11.
999 Id.
1000 Id. at *12.
1001 Id. at *14.
298
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
gued that "unauthorized access" is the same as "exceeding au-
thorized access," but the court noted that the CFAA explicitly
distinguishes between the two types of conduct.'11
2
-In the alternative, the court noted that plaintiff failed to ade-
quately allege it was damaged, as defined in the CFAA. 1003 The
CFAA defines damages as "'any impairment to the integrity or
availability of data, a program, a system, or information."'' 10 0 4
Plaintiff claimed it was damaged by the mere "taking of informa-
tion," which the court held was insufficient.l" 5 Thus, plaintiffs
claim under the CFAA was dismissed and since it was the only
federal claim asserted, the court also dismissed the state law
claims for breach of contract based on lack of jurisdiction. 100 6
B. ToiARzz v. LOT POLISH AIRLINES1 0 07
Tokarz, doing business asJ.J. Store ("Plaintiff'), sued LOT Po-
lish Airlines (LOT) for events arising from LOT's termination of
its contract with plaintiff.00 8 The contract permitted plaintiff to
sell airline tickets on LOT's nonstop flights between New York
and Poland and to receive commissions in certain instances for
its sales, including base and volume commissions.""" LOT per-
mitted its agents to take a portion of their commissions directly
from the sales they made, which many agents, including plain-
tiff, used as a means to reduce the airfare. 111 Though this price
reduction practice violated every agent's agreement with LOT,
LOT rarely took action on the violations. 0 1 ' Yet, LOT did take
action against plaintiff; namely LOT terminated the contract be-
cause LOT believed that plaintiff, unlike the other travel agents,
was markedly reducing prices below its published fares by the
full amount of its entitled commissions. 1012 In its complaint,
plaintiff asserted claims for antitrust violations, breach of con-
tract, fraud, and tortuous interference with prospective eco-
1o2 Id. at *12.
1003 Id. at *14.
1004 Id. (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(8) (2006)).
1005 Id. at *15.
1006 Id. at *14, *16.
1007 No. 96-CV-3154 (FB) (JMA), 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 72118 (E.D.N.Y. Sept.
29, 2006).
1008 Id. at *2.
1oo9 Id. at *4.
1OlO Id. at *4-5.
1o1, Id. at *7.
1012 i.
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nomic advantage against LOT. 10 13 Specifically, plaintiff alleged
that LOT conspired with competing travel agents to fix retained
commissions and ticket prices. 10 14 According to plaintiff, LOT
terminated its commission agreement with plaintiff after it re-
ceived a letter signed by six competing travel agents, which com-
plained that plaintiff was discounting tickets below LOT's
published fares in violation of the agreement. °1 5
After a bench trial in the United States District Court, Eastern
District of New York, the court dismissed all of plaintiffs claims
except those related to the payment of unpaid commissions. 0 1 6
The court found that plaintiff failed to establish that LOT termi-
nated the contract "in furtherance of a common plan" with
others and that LOT did not conspire to fix commissions or
ticket prices in violation of antitrust laws.10 1 7
Plaintiff's antitrust claims were premised on federal (the Sher-
man Act) and New York (the Donnelly Act) laws that were mate-
rially identical.' 1 8 Plaintiff claimed that LOT's termination of
the contract was meant to assist plaintiffs competitors-specifi-
cally, other agents selling LOT's airline tickets-by fixing their
retained commissions and ticket prices."" The court noted
that plaintiff had the burden of showing that defendant's deci-
sion to terminate its contract was something more than the law-
ful unilateral conduct of a single enterprise.1 2  Plaintiff's
showing that six travel agents complained to LOT about plain-
tiff's price-cutting practices merely demonstrated that the agents
were upset, not that they colluded to have plaintiffs contract
terminated.' 0 2' Likewise, even though the relevant provision of
the contract prohibited price-cutting and LOT regularly failed
to terminate the contracts of other agents reducing airfare,
plaintiffs price-cutting practice was far more severe than that of
other agents, thus justifying a departure from defendant's "usual
indifference.' 1 22 In short, there was insufficient evidence of a
"common plan" between LOT and its other agents. 10 23
1013 Id. at *2.
1014 Id. at *12-13.
1015 Id. at *6.
1016 Id. at *14.
1017 Id. at *12-13.
1018 Id. at *9.
lO19 Id. at *8-9.
1020 Id. at *9-10.




Plaintiffs three other claims were also dismissed. 1 24 First, the
breach of contract claim was insufficient because the agreement
clearly stated that it could be terminated by either party upon
thirty days' written notice, which LOT complied with when it
terminated the agreement. 0 25 Second, the tortuous interfer-
ence claim failed because plaintiff could not show that LOT ac-
ted "solely out of malice, or used dishonest, unfair, or improper
means" when the contract was terminated. 10 26 Lastly, the fraud
claim was dismissed because plaintiff could not adequately show
that "but for the [alleged] misrepresentation [in negotiating the
contract], it would have secured more favorable terms" in its
contract with LOT. 10 2 7 Plaintiff, however, was permitted to seek
recovery for the unpaid commissions it earned while the con-
tract was still in effect. 10 28
XX. GROUND VICTIM DAMAGES
A. LAWLER V. AMERICAN AIRLINES, INC. (IN RE AIR CRASH AT
BELLE HARBOR, NEW YoRK ON NOVEMBER 12, 2001)1121
As a result of the American Airlines aircraft crash on Novem-
ber 12, 2001, plaintiff sued Airbus and American Airlines on his
own behalf and on behalf of three children with respect to the
death of two family members in the crash, as well as damage to
personal and real property as a result of the crash.'0 30 Both de-
fendants moved for partial summary judgment regarding plain-
fiff's claims for mental injuries, such as those claims "for grief,
sorrow, shock, and mental distress."'10 3 1 The court ruled for de-
fendants, holding that, under New York law, recovery in wrong-
ful death cases is limited to losses for pecuniary injuries-not
"loss of consortium, mental anguish, or grief damages. "1032
Thus, plaintiffs alleged mental injuries related to the dece-
dent's wrongful death were not recoverable as a matter of
law. 103
3
1024 Id. at *13.
1025 Id.
1026 Id. at *13 (quoting Carvel Corp. v. Noonan, 350 F.3d 6, 17 (2d Cir. 2003)).
1027 Id. at *14.
1028 Id.
1029 450 F. Supp. 2d 432 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
1030 Id. at 433.
1031 Id.
1032 Id.
1033 Id. at 434.
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In addition, plaintiff could not recover alleged mental injuries
under a personal injury or bystander theory, as a matter of
law. 103 4 Respectively, the children-claimants and plaintiff were
not themselves physically injured as a result of the crash, and
they were neither in'the zone of danger nor witnesses of their
family members' deaths from the zone of danger. 1 3 5 Also, the
court held that New York law precludes the recovery of damages
for mental injuries arising from damage to property, including
plaintiffs family residence. 03 6
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